“EQUAL CITIZENSHIP STATURE”:
JUSTICE GINSBURG’S
CONSTITUTIONAL VISION
NEIL S. SIEGEL
Abstract: In this essay, Professor Siegel examines the nature and function of
constitutional visions in the American constitutional order. He argues that
Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg possesses such a vision and that her
vision is defined by her oft-stated commitment to “full human stature,” to
“equal citizenship stature.” He then defends Justice Ginsburg’s
characteristically incremental and moderate approach to realizing her vision.
He does so in part by establishing that President Barack Obama articulated a
similar vision and approach in his Philadelphia speech on American race
relations and illustrated its capacity to succeed during the 2008 presidential
election.
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INTRODUCTION
Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has served on the Supreme
Court of the United States for more than fifteen years. The passage of time
provides good reason to take pause and reflect on her contributions to the
development of the law. I commend the editors of the New England Law
Review for marking this occasion with a symposium in her honor.
I shall train my attention on the progressive constitutional vision that I
believe animates Justice Ginsburg’s understanding of our Constitution. In
several areas of constitutional law, her overarching vision is concisely
captured by a phrase to which she often returns, both on and off the bench.
Our Constitution, in Justice Ginsburg’s view, guarantees “equal citizenship
stature.”1 Its majestic and open-ended language is best read aspirationally
and expansively: Each generation of Americans advances the constitutional
design by slowly but surely coming to comprehend such commitments as
“the equal protection of the laws”2 to include within their embrace groups
who previously did not count in constituting “the People”3 for whom the
Constitution purports to speak. Justice Ginsburg’s Constitution not only
constitutes; it also reconstitutes. It empowers persons by including them in
core activities associated with citizenship, and it includes persons by
empowering them—and it accomplishes more of both over time. In so
doing, our Constitution makes good on its declaration of intent “to form a
more perfect Union.”4
In this essay, I pay tribute to Justice Ginsburg’s constitutional vision.
I begin by examining the general role that constitutional visions play in the
American constitutional order. I pursue this question both from the
perspective of the judiciary and, more importantly, from the perspective of
the American public. I suggest that successful visions partially integrate the
domains of constitutional politics and constitutional law, thereby rendering
the countermajoritarian difficulty less difficult in practice.
I next focus on Justice Ginsburg’s vision in particular. Drawing from
her judicial opinions and other public pronouncements, I show that her
vision lends coherence and depth to a potentially distinct set of
1. See infra Part II (detailing many instances in which Justice Ginsburg uses this or
similar language).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
4. Id.
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constitutional commitments. Justice Ginsburg’s approach provides an
affirmative—indeed, heroic—answer to the question whether there is such
a thing as a progressive constitutional vision.
Finally, I explore the politics of persuasion that must be reckoned
with by Americans who seek to realize something like Justice Ginsburg’s
inclusive vision. In approaching this difficult subject, I focus on the
example set by President Barack Obama during the 2008 presidential
campaign. Analyzing his Philadelphia speech on race relations in America,
I observe that our nation’s forty-fourth President appears to espouse a
constitutional vision that is similar to Justice Ginsburg’s. I further note that
President Obama seems to share Justice Ginsburg’s general approach to
realizing her constitutional vision—namely, a tendency to favor
incrementalism and moderation. This tendency, I suggest, stems not from
cowardice or indecision, but from a constitutional vision that relies on—
and seeks to empower—ordinary Americans to realize constitutional
change, and that views our Constitution as a work in progress and not as an
already perfected document. I suggest that the substance, style, and
electoral success of President Obama’s aspirational politics may have much
to offer Americans who share Justice Ginsburg’s constitutional
commitments and who work to make them a governing reality in our
national politics and our constitutional law. I also suggest that President
Obama’s approach calls into question progressive criticism of Justice
Ginsburg as an excessively cautious jurist.
DISCUSSION
I.

The Function of Constitutional Visions

Before turning to Justice Ginsburg’s constitutional vision in
particular, I will begin with the general idea of a constitutional vision.
Much progressive legal scholarship uses the term “constitutional vision”
without defining it.5 This may be because it is a difficult concept to pin
down. In this Part, I offer a rough account of the nature and function of a
constitutional vision.
A striking aspect of the decision making of the early Roberts Court is
the near-perfect extent to which the Justices can be grouped into the same
ideological blocks in certain deeply divisive cases. Such cases are well
described by Anthony Kronman’s notion of “identity-defining” conflicts,
so named because the choices they require “define the community that
makes them in the same way that some personal choices define the

5. See, for example, many of the contributions in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020 (Jack M.
Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009).
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individual who does.”6 For example, in constitutional litigation involving
government regulation of abortion,7 race and equal protection,8 the
meaning and scope of the Second Amendment,9 eligibility for the death
penalty,10 the detention or trial of alleged enemy combatants,11 campaign
finance legislation,12 federal laws aimed at protecting the environment,13
and the domestic judicial enforceability of international law,14 four
Justices—Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito—
almost always agree with one another. Likewise, four other Justices—
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer—almost always agree with
one another. And Justice Kennedy (who, it is relevant to note, was
President Reagan’s third choice) proves decisive by agreeing with one side
or the other. In cases implicating these profound questions of personal and
collective identity, this 5-4 or 4-1-4 fracture best characterizes the Roberts

6. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 88-89 (1993) (“In the political sphere, as in the personal, there are some choices
that have what I call identity-defining consequences.”); id. at 90 (“[T]hose controversies that
happen at any moment to be the most lively and important ones in a community—those with
the largest implications for its direction and destiny—often present conflicts among values
that reflect incomparable visions of what is most worthy in the community’s current
practices or future possibilities . . . .”).
7. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1619 (2007).
8. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,
2741-43 (2007); cf. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S.Ct. 2658 (2009) (dividing 5-4 over whether a
city violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by discarding the results of an exam
used to identify firefighters best qualified to fill vacant lieutenant and captain positions
when the results of the exam showed that white candidates had significantly outperformed
minority candidates).
9. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2787-88 (2008).
10. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650-51 (2008).
11. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548
U.S. 557, 572-73 (2006).
12. See, e.g., Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008); Federal
Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
13. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). Rapanos was technically a
statutory case, but the statutory analyses took place in the shadow of the Constitution. The
plurality invoked federalism concerns and constitutional avoidance. Id. at 737-38.
Moreover, Justice Kennedy wrote of the test he would use that “in most cases regulation of
wetlands that are adjacent to tributaries and possess a significant nexus with navigable
waters will raise no serious constitutional or federalism difficulty.” Id. at 782 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in judgment).
14. See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1349 (2008); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,
548 U.S. 331, 337 (2006).
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Court, which is why it is often called the Kennedy Court.15 It is not merely
that the views of the Justices within each block are positively correlated
across these issue areas. The Justices can, almost without exception,16 be
counted on to agree with the other members of their voting block on all of
these issues—and, in all likelihood, others as well.17 As Christopher
Eisgruber recently noted with only modest overstatement, “If you tell me
where a justice stands on abortion, I can tell you what that justice’s position
is on affirmative action, gun control, criminal procedure, federalism and
other privacy issues.”18
What best explains this degree of overlap in constitutional
conclusions? One possibility is that these areas of constitutional litigation
constitute distinct issues—a series of jurisprudential “silos”—so that the
overlap is merely or mostly a coincidental consequence of the current
composition of a court with only nine members. A more likely possibility is
that identifiable forces are producing these results. For example, it might be
the case that the Justices’ views in these areas of law are informed by
distinct constitutional visions.19
15. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, When It Matters Most, It Is Still the Kennedy Court,
11 GREEN BAG 2D 427 (2008). I do not discuss the voting behavior of Justice Sotomayor in
this essay because she joined the Court only recently.
16. Medellín and Sanchez-Llamas are partial exceptions. In Medellín, Justice Stevens
concurred in the judgment, expressing great sympathy for the dissenting views of Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer but voting on the same side as the other group of four.
Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1372. In Sanchez-Llamas, Justice Ginsburg concurred in the
judgment, joining only part of Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion, which Justices Stevens
and Souter joined in full. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 360, 365.
17. Controversies falling under the general heading of gay rights or church/state
separation should also be included on any list of identity-defining conflicts. The Roberts
Court has yet to render a decision concerning the extent to which the Constitution protects
homosexuals from discrimination. Likewise, the Roberts Court has yet to render any
Establishment Clause decisions. But cf. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S.
Ct. 2553, 2567-68 (2007) (holding 5-4—along predictable ideological lines—that taxpayers
do not have standing to assert an Establishment Clause claim against Executive Branch
actions funded by general appropriations, as opposed to a specific congressional grant).
18. Adam Liptak, To Nudge, Shift, or Shove the Court Left, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2009, at
WK4. Professor Eisgruber also noted the “surprising amount of ideological coherence on
the court over the last 30 years.” Id.
19. It would be difficult to account for these voting blocs in terms of theories of
constitutional interpretation. Seven Justices do not purport to possess a theory of
interpretation, and the two that do (Justices Scalia and Thomas) do not always follow them.
For example, it is not clear how the original public meaning of the First, Fifth, or Fourteenth
Amendments compels (or even supports) the views of Justices Scalia and Thomas in racial
equality, campaign finance, or commercial speech cases. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman,
Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 92 (2009) (The basis for Scalia’s and Thomas’s
colorblindness “assertions was and is mysterious—at least for an announced (and
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The significant underdeterminacy of our Constitution’s open-ended
provisions20 establishes a contestable “realm of meaning” or “nomos.”21 A
constitutional vision, in the general way that I use the term here, identifies
these open-ended provisions with a set of values to which the national
political community should aspire. A vision does so by providing a
substantive account of how government power should be exercised and
how individual rights should be protected in the American constitutional
order. Such a vision provides a basic understanding of our Constitution—
its meaning and the purposes it is charged with accomplishing—that
animates and integrates responses to a range of constitutional questions.22
Constitutional visions can thus be thought of as an answer to the
problem of issue bundling in law and politics. A vision identifies a set of
values to which the adherent is presumptively committed. When the
adherent perceives that these values are implicated in various contexts, he
or she is moved consistently to hold certain views about how best to
resolve questions arising in these contexts. Like a theory of constitutional
interpretation, therefore, a constitutional vision can be deeply principled.
A constitutional vision, however, is distinct from a theory of
constitutional interpretation. While some jurists and commentators portray
theories of constitutional interpretation as constraining judicial discretion,23

proselytizing) Originalist. Not only does the constitutional text say no such thing . . . , but
the best evidence of the original intentions is that the framers did not intend to
constitutionalize a principle of strict colorblindness.” (footnotes omitted)); Neil S. Siegel,
Umpires at Bat: On Integration and Legitimation, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 701, 718-19 (2007)
(discussing the non-originalist character of their views in race cases); Lori A. Ringhand,
Judicial Activism: An Empirical Examination of Voting Behavior on the Rehnquist Natural
Court, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 43, 52-53 (2007) (discussing the non-originalist character of
their views in First Amendment cases). Nor is Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Heller as
originalist as it purports to be. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as
Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 193 (2008) (“It is, to say the
least, striking that an originalist interpretation of the Second Amendment would treat civic
republican understandings of the amendment as antiquated, and refuse to protect the arms a
militia needs to defend against tyranny.”).
20. For a discussion, see generally, for example, Siegel, supra note 19.
21. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 28 (1983).
22. Cf., e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,
2836 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (referencing “different good-faith visions of our country
and our Constitution”).
23. Thus, for example, Keith Whittington observes of originalists writing in the 1970s
and 1980s:
[O]riginalism was thought to limit the discretion of the judge. . . . By
rooting judges in the firm ground of text, history, well-accepted
historical traditions, and the like, originalists hoped to discipline them.
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constitutional visions are not meant to constrain discretion, let alone yield
logically determinate results in particular controversies. On the contrary,
constitutional visions are meant to provide affirmative accounts of how
power should (or should not) be utilized in order to achieve a set of
normative ends that are asserted to be both central concerns of the
Constitution and central concerns in the lives of citizens. Constitutional
visions relate the one set of concerns to the other.
Constitutional visions reflect the pervasive reality that the authority of
the Constitution flows in part from its expression of enduring and evolving
social values—from its status as the repository of our “fundamental nature
as a people,” which “is sacred and demands our respectful
acknowledgement.”24 Thus, Woodrow Wilson insisted that “the
Constitution of the United States is not a mere lawyers’ document: it is a
vehicle of life, and its spirit is always the spirit of the age.”25 Likewise,
Franklin Roosevelt invoked the “original broad concept of the Constitution
as a layman’s instrument of government.”26 By such statements, these
Presidents meant that the Constitution must be understood as an expression
of the deepest cultural values of our nation.27 Presidents may articulate
constitutional visions,28 and the Justices they appoint may (explicitly or
implicitly) possess constitutional visions as well. Indeed, the degree of

The ‘political seduction of the law’ was a constant threat in a system
that armed judges with the powerful weapon of judicial review, and the
best response to that threat was to lash judges to the solid mast of
history.
Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 602 (2004).
24. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167, 167, 169
(1987).
25. WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 69
(Transaction Publishers 2002) (1908).
26. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Address in Washington, D.C.: The Constitution of the
United States Was a Layman’s Document, Not a Lawyer’s Contract (Sept. 17, 1937), in 6
THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 363 (Samuel I. Rosenman
ed., 1941).
27. See Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction:
Neutral Principles, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CAL.
L. REV. 1473, 1501 (2007).
28. For an insightful discussion of constitutional visions that focuses on the pathmarking
politics of certain transformative presidents, see KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 53-58 (2007).
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overlap between basic visions may be a principal reason that a particular
President seeks to put a particular individual on the Supreme Court of the
United States.29
Of course, this is not to suggest that Presidents and Justices may
appropriately do the same things with a constitutional vision. Presidents
and Justices occupy different institutional roles that serve distinct, if
partially overlapping, sets of social functions.30 Moreover, they typically
confront different kinds of issues, and even when they consider the same
questions, they do so at different points in time while operating under
different constraints.31 For example, a President need not concern him- or
herself with securing the social “goods of consistency, stability,
predictability, and transparency that are essential to the rule of law”32 to
nearly the same extent as a Supreme Court Justice.33 Presidents and Justices
who possess similar constitutional visions remain different actors in
critically important ways.
Accordingly, to suggest that both Presidents and Justices may possess
constitutional visions is not to obliterate distinctions between judicial role
and political role or to insist that the same considerations are relevant to the
legitimation of each. But it is to suggest that “ragged and blurred
boundaries”34 often separate the realm of constitutional law from the
domain of constitutional politics. It seems right to affirm both that legal
reasoning is characteristically distinguishable from the practice of electoral
politics, and that legal reasoning can be partially defined by the logic of an
integrating constitutional conception that I call a constitutional vision—a

29. Presidents often refer to a judicial nominee’s “judicial philosophy,” which might be
thought to refer to an interpretive methodology. But I suspect that most often this term
refers, at least implicitly, to a constitutional vision.
30. I have elsewhere discussed various purposes of the institution of law, some of which
are more central to law and others of which are also regarded as core purposes of politics.
Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 969-79 (2008).
31. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 26 (1962) (“Their insulation and the marvelous mystery of
time give courts the capacity to appeal to men’s better natures, to call forth their aspirations,
which may have been forgotten in the moment’s hue and cry.”).
32. Post & Siegel, supra note 27, at 1477.
33. For a discussion of rule-of-law values and the particular importance that our
constitutional community places on their vindication by courts, see JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of
Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 210-26 (1979); Siegel, supra note 30, at 965,
970-71; Post & Siegel, supra note 27, at 1476-77; Neil S. Siegel, A Theory In Search of a
Court, and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951,
2015-16 (2005).
34. Post & Siegel, supra note 27, at 1474. For further discussions, see generally Siegel,
supra note 19; Siegel, supra note 30.
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logic that is shared by a certain register of political language and vision.
Both Presidents and Justices may appropriately be constitutionalists in the
cultural sense.
Indeed, constitutional visions do not merely inform both politics and
jurisprudence. Persuasive visions partially integrate the two domains. The
vision of a President may end up having a profound long-term impact on
constitutional law.35 And sometimes the principled judicial imagination
synthesizes subject matters in a way that both maintains judicial legitimacy
and proves instructive for a broader political effort to articulate a normative
vision with the power to move people.
To understand the integrative function that constitutional visions
perform, it is useful to consider the problem that has preoccupied
constitutional theory for much of the past century, the “countermajoritarian difficulty.”36 A constitutional vision provides a potentially
persuasive response to the question of what business nine unelected (and
highly opinionated) judges have telling popular majorities that they cannot
govern in whatever way they want. The persuasiveness of this response
does not derive simply from associating a particular normative vision with
“the law” and then insisting upon the autonomy of “the law” from “mere”
politics, portraying the Justices as duty-bound to “interpret” and “apply”
the law.37 No doubt there are certain rhetorical advantages associated with

35. Cf. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change:
From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489,
490 (2006) [hereinafter Balkin & Levinson, Change]; Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson,
Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1067 (2001) [hereinafter
Balkin & Levinson, Revolution].
36. BICKEL, supra note 31, at 16 (“The root difficulty is that judicial review is a countermajoritarian force in our system.”).
37. Id. at 74 (“Judges and lawyers recurrently come to feel that they find law rather than
make it. Many otherwise painful problems seem to solve themselves with ease when this
feeling envelops people.”). Of course, this way of talking about constitutional law has been
with us from the beginning. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738,
866 (1824) (“Courts are the mere instruments of the law . . . .”).
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autonomy rhetoric.38 But it contemplates a sharp distinction between
constitutional politics and constitutional law when the two must share a
dialectical relation if constitutional law is to retain its legitimacy.39
Moreover, the rhetorical advantages of this approach are easily
overstated. As I have written about Chief Justice Roberts’ use of the
“umpire analogy” during his Supreme Court confirmation hearing,40 if
Americans think they want judicial umpires, they also want umpires who
call the game their way, at least on the issues they care about most.41 This
is why engaged citizens worry about who in particular sits on the Supreme
Court and why the future of the Court is often an issue in presidential
elections. It is also why no Democratic President would have nominated
John Roberts or Samuel Alito for a seat on the Court, and why no
Republican President would have nominated Sonia Sotomayor. These
observations might seem too obvious to be worth recording, yet autonomy
rhetoric cannot make any sense of them.
A better approach begins with the recognition that the constitutional
law pronounced by courts is not self-legitimating—that in discharging their
responsibilities, the Justices must attend to the conditions of the
legitimation of the law that they craft. Elsewhere, I have identified this

38. See, e.g., Martin Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Adjudication: Of
Politics and Neutral Principles, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 587, 601 (1963) (“The distinction
between what the Court says to the public about what it is doing and what scholars say to
one another about what it is doing must be held firmly in mind . . . . It would be fantastic
indeed if the Supreme Court in the name of sound scholarship were to publicly disavow the
myth upon which its power rests.”); Siegel, supra note 19.
39. See Post & Siegel, supra note 27; Siegel, supra note 30. For a discussion, see
generally Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003).
40. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005)
(statement of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr.), available at http://www.gpoaccess.
gov/congress/senate/judiciary/sh109-158/55-56.pdf. (“Judges are like umpires. Umpires
don’t make the rules, they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They
make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball
game to see the umpire.”). During her Supreme Court confirmation hearing, Judge
Sotomayor made similar statements. See, e.g., Sotomayor Pledges “Fidelity to the Law,”
CNNPOLITICS.COM, available at http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/07/13/sotomayor
.hearing/index.html?iref=hpmostpop (visited Nov. 23, 2009) (“In the past month, many
senators have asked me about my judicial philosophy. It is simple: fidelity to the law. The
task of a judge is not to make the law—it is to apply the law. And it is clear, I believe, that
my record in two courts reflects my rigorous commitment to interpreting the Constitution
according to its terms . . . .”).
41. See Siegel, supra note 19, at 731. Full disclosure: I served on the Judiciary
Committee Staff of then-Senator Joseph Biden during the hearing.
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component of judicial role as the virtue of judicial statesmanship.42 “The
Court is a leader of opinion, not a mere register of it,” Alexander Bickel
instructed, “but it must lead opinion, not merely impose its own; and—the
short of it is—it labors under the obligation to succeed.”43 Constitutional
visions ameliorate the countermajoritarian difficulty to the extent that the
Justices who possess them succeed over the long haul in securing the
assent—or, at least, the acceptance—of the very people whose conduct the
Court purports to govern in the name of the Constitution.44
It may not be necessary for the Court to persuade a majority of
Americans of the correctness of its rulings. But it must at least succeed in
persuading a good number of Americans to abide by its decisions. With
apologies to Justice Jackson,45 the Court is not truly final:
The southern leaders [who opposed Brown] understood and
acted upon an essential truth, which we do not often have
occasion to observe and which dawned on the southerners
themselves somewhat late; hence the contrast between initial
reactions and what followed. The Supreme Court’s law, the
southern leaders realized, could not in our system prevail—not
merely in the very long run, but within the decade—if it ran
counter to deeply felt popular needs or convictions, or even if it
was opposed by a determined and substantial minority and
received with indifference by the rest of the country. This, in the
end, is how and why judicial review is consistent with the theory
and practice of political democracy. This is why the Supreme
Court is a court of last resort presumptively only.46

More regularly, the confirmation process ensures that the current Court is
not final,47 as does the frequent practice of norm contestation through
presidential rhetoric and constitutional litigation.48 Moreover, in rare but
important circumstances, the threat or reality of constitutional amendment
can give the Court pause.

42.
43.
44.
45.

See generally Siegel, supra note 30.
BICKEL, supra note 31, at 239.
See Siegel, supra note 30, at 983-85. See generally Siegel, supra note 19, at 718-19.
See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result)
(“We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are
final.”).
46. BICKEL, supra note 31, at 258.
47. See Balkin & Levinson, Revolution, supra note 35, at 1067-69.
48. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in THE
CONSTITUTION IN 2020, supra note 5, at 28-29.
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The foregoing explanation of why constitutional visions matter is
judge-centered, and appropriately so: the countermajoritarian difficulty is a
problem with which judges must contend, and a persuasive constitutional
vision may help them competently to execute their responsibilities in
crafting constitutional law. But it is at least as important—indeed,
ultimately more important—to examine the bridging function of
constitutional visions from the perspective of constitutional politics, not
constitutional law. That is, it is critical to explore the problem not only
from the perspective of a Court whose authority must be legitimated, but
also from the perspective of participants in constitutional politics who
possess a vision and who wish to see it embodied in constitutional law.
In her public interactions, Justice Ginsburg has herself emphasized
this side of the dialectical interaction; she recognizes the primacy of
engaged citizens, social movements, and legal advocates in determining the
ultimate success of any constitutional vision. For example, in concluding a
1997 lecture that she delivered at the Hofstra Law School summer program
in Nice, France, she did not emphasize her own majority opinion in the
VMI case, United States v. Virginia.49 Rather, she underscored the
“[l]itigation pursued by lawyers in the public interest,” which “had helped
to make it ever more possible for our daughters, as well as our sons, to
aspire and achieve according to their individual talent and capacities.”50
Similarly, during a 2004 question-and-answer session with students at
the City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law, Justice Ginsburg
was asked to name “one or two of the most important legal issues that . . .
the United States Supreme Court faces today.”51 She sought “to amend the
question slightly to say: ‘What are the most important issues the people of
the United States are facing today?’”52 Stressing “the balance between
liberty and security,” she insisted that “[i]f the people don’t care about
preserving their liberty and are overwhelmed by security concerns, there is
no court that can change that sad development.”53 She noted that courts

49. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
50. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Constitutional Adjudication in the United States as a Means

of Advancing the Equal Stature of Men and Women Under the Law, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV.
263, 271 (1997). As my able research assistant, Natalie Bedoya, pointed out to me, the title
of this piece identifies constitutional litigation as the means and advancing equal citizenship
stature as the end. Visions specify ends. See infra Part II (exploring Justice Ginsburg’s
constitutional vision).
51. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks of Ruth Bader Ginsburg at CUNY School of Law
(Mar. 11, 2004), in 7 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 221, 232 (2004).
52. Id.
53. Id.
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“are reactive institutions. We don’t create the controversies that come to us,
we respond to the problems that are emerging in the society the courts exist
to serve.”54
Later at the same event, she was asked whether the U.S. Supreme
Court would invalidate the death penalty “in our lifetimes.”55 Rather than
talking about the composition of the Court, she responded that “[o]n a
question like that, you are as competent to judge as I am,” and she
reiterated that “[i]f people don’t care, it won’t happen. If people do care,
and there are many lawyers who do, I hope their ranks will grow, change
will become possible.”56 Again, she elected to underscore not the Court’s
power to enact or resist social change, but the ultimate authority of the
American public.
From the standpoint of constitutional politics, the primary purpose of
a constitutional vision is not necessarily to maintain the law/politics
distinction. Quite the contrary, the main purpose may be to unsettle it—to
enable citizens through political mobilization eventually to impact the
future path of constitutional law. Throughout American history, the impact
of political mobilization on constitutional law has been ubiquitous and
profound. Among many other things, this seems the most sensible way to
account for the evolution of the Court’s racial equality jurisprudence,57 its
sex discrimination jurisprudence,58 its abortion jurisprudence,59 and now,
its Second Amendment jurisprudence. As Reva Siegel has shown,60 social
movement struggle helps to explain the contours of the Court’s recent

54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id. at 236.
Id.
See generally Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470
(2004).
58. See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and
Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1324 (2006)
(“The ERA was not ratified, but the amendment’s proposal and defeat played a crucial role
in enabling and shaping the modern law of sex discrimination. Yet constitutional law [as
typically conceived] lacks tools to explain constitutional change of this kind.”).
59. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 30, at 1028-29 (discussing the doctrinal evolution from
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), to Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007)).
60. Professor Siegel offers an account of the social movement conflict that ultimately
shaped Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Heller. Siegel, supra note 19, at 191, 192-93
(showing how Heller respects claims and compromises forged in social movement conflict
over the right to bear arms in the decades after Brown).
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declaration—for the first time in American history—that the Constitution
protects an individual right to possess a handgun in the home for purposes
of self-defense.61
It is precisely because constitutional law “is historically conditioned
and politically shaped”62 that constitutional visions are potentially so
consequential. Without a vision—not a series of discrete political positions
on unrelated issues, but a vision—it may be impossible to persuade one’s
fellow citizens to adopt one’s conception of American identity as their
own. It takes a vision that ties particular constitutional understandings to
the ideals and interests of large numbers of Americans consistently to elect
Presidents who appoint judges who in turn embody that vision in
constitutional law.63 It does not happen overnight. Slowly but surely,
however, politics becomes law, as it did in Heller,64 or law returns to the
realm of “mere” politics, as happened during the constitutional crisis of
1937.65 Constitutional visions partially integrate constitutional politics and
constitutional law. They are a powerful means through which citizens and
the leaders they elect seek to shape the course of constitutional law.

61. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821-22 (2008) (holding that the
Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm—including a
handgun—unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that firearm for traditionally
lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home).
62. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN
HISTORY AND POLITICS 6 (2002).
63. It is no coincidence that our most influential Presidents, particularly Franklin
Roosevelt and Abraham Lincoln, possessed coherent constitutional visions. See
WHITTINGTON, supra note 28, at 53-54, 56-58. “The ‘New Deal’ was more than a slogan for
a particular list of policies. The New Deal was the realization of Roosevelt’s constitutional
vision, an effort to achieve ‘greater freedom [and] greater security for the average man.’” Id.
at 57 (quoting Roosevelt, supra note 26). As for Lincoln, “the promissory note of the
Declaration of Independence’s egalitarianism had to be repaid and the temporary
compromise with slavery had to be abandoned.” WHITTINGTON, supra note 28, at 58 n.120.
More recently, President Reagan articulated a conservative constitutional vision, much of
which has been implemented over the past few decades. See infra note 66 and
accompanying text.
64. See generally Siegel, supra note 19.
65. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three:
The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1387 (2001) (“The proper lesson of
Lochner instructs us that, even where it is possible to identify a jurisprudential basis for
judicial decisions, if those familiar with the Court’s decisions do not believe those decisions
to be socially correct, the work of judges will be seen as illegitimate. There will be attacks
on judges and, ultimately, on the institution of judicial review. Even in the face of
established precedent, law itself will come to be seen as nothing but politics.”) (referencing
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
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II. Justice Ginsburg’s Inclusive Vision
It is well established that there currently exists a conservative
constitutional vision on the U.S. Supreme Court.66 Rather than offering my
own account of the content of this vision, I will show that there also is a
coherent progressive vision, one that Justice Ginsburg has been expressing
since her days as a legal advocate on behalf of women’s rights during the
1970s. I will identify the vision that informs and integrates Justice
Ginsburg’s responses to constitutional questions with identity-defining
dimensions.67
Those who (accurately) think of Justice Ginsburg as “a judge’s judge”
or “a lawyer’s lawyer”68 may object that it is inappropriate to associate her
with something so seemingly grand as a constitutional vision. After all, she
can become obsessed—her clerks might suggest “possessed”—by the most

66. If originalism is understood not as a theory of constitutional interpretation but as a
conservative political movement advancing themes of traditional family, public religion,
racial retrenchment, state sovereignty, and social control, then Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito are well described as possessing much the same
constitutional vision. See generally Post & Siegel, supra note 48; Jamal Greene, Selling
Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657 (2009); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a
Political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006); Dawn
E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congressional Power: Presidential
Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L. REV. 363, 408 (2003) (“President Reagan’s
efforts to transform constitutional meaning put him in a class with Franklin D. Roosevelt
and a handful of other Presidents. Reagan developed and pursued a constitutional vision
extraordinary in its breadth of issues, its detail of analysis, and its ambition for presidential
power.”). Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito were chosen to
advance this conservative vision, and each has done so. It is striking how much of the vision
has been realized.
67. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing the idea of identity-defining
conflicts). I do not address here the extent to which Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer
possess identifiable constitutional visions, nor do I explore the degree of overlap between
their approaches and that of Justice Ginsburg. But judging from their voting patterns and the
frequency with which they join (or cite) one another’s opinions, it seems likely that the
degree of overlap is substantial and that there are some differences. Relative to Justice
Ginsburg, for example, Justice Breyer puts more emphasis on themes of deference to
democratic decision making. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY:
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005). I leave Justice Sotomayor aside
because she just joined the Court.
68. See, e.g., Joyce A. Baugh, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A Judge’s Judge and a Lawyer’s
Lawyer, in SUPREME COURT JUSTICES IN THE POST-BORK ERA: CONFIRMATION POLITICS AND
JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 61-80 (2002); Judith Baer, Advocate on the Court: Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and the Limits of Formal Equality, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE
COURT DYNAMIC 216, 216 (Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003) (quoting Peter Huber & Richard
Taranto, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Judge’s Judge, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1993, at A18).
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technical questions of civil procedure,69 and she is better known for her
cautious and careful approach to controversial questions than for theoretical
ascents.70 No doubt, she does not ascribe to a theory of constitutional
interpretation. But she has long possessed a foundational understanding of
the cultural ideals that our Constitution is charged with realizing over time.
During her Supreme Court confirmation hearing, then-Judge
Ginsburg put the Senate and the public on notice of the core content of her
constitutional vision. Senator Orrin Hatch asked whether she agreed that
“[t]he only legitimate way for a judge to go about defining the law is by
attempting to discern what those who made the law intended.”71 While she
thought everyone could agree with this statement, she also cautioned
against relying on the “immediate” [intentions of the Framers] “for their
day” [in light of] “their larger expectation that the Constitution would
govern, as Cardozo said, not for the passing hour, but for the expanding
future.”72
To illustrate her point, she tellingly turned to the author of the
Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson, who once opined that
“‘[w]ere our state a pure democracy, there would still be excluded from our
deliberations women who, to prevent depravation of morals and ambiguity
of issues, should not mix promiscuously in gatherings of men.’”73 Noting
that Jefferson’s “understanding of ‘all men are created equal’ . . . for his
day, for his time” was that “‘the breasts of women were not made for
political convulsion,’” she stated that she saw “an immediate intent about
how an ideal is going to be recognized at a given time and place, but also a

69. For a characteristic, if little known, example of Justice Ginsburg’s mastery of
procedural questions, see generally her opinion for a unanimous Court in Kontrick v. Ryan,
540 U.S. 443 (2004).
70. See, e.g., Baer, supra note 68, at 221-22 (identifying John Marshall Harlan II as
Justice Ginsburg’s judicial “hero” and arguing that she “has demonstrated a similar style of
what might be called restrained activism or activist restraint”). Certain decisions of the
Court’s recently reconstituted majority have caused Justice Ginsburg to move somewhat
from being a cautious liberal to being, at times, an angry liberal. See Gonzales v. Carhart,
550 U.S. 124, 169-71 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 643 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg read from
the bench her dissents in both cases. It is rare for her to read a dissent from the bench once a
Term, let alone twice. See Linda Greenhouse, Oral Dissents Give Ginsburg a New Voice on
Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007, at A1. For discussion of these cases, see infra notes 110126, 208-209 and accompanying text.
71. The Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 127
(1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
72. Id. (statement of J. Ginsburg).
73. Id.
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larger aspiration as our society improves. I think the Framers were
intending to create a more perfect union that would become ever more
perfect over time.”74
Justice Ginsburg thus underscored for the Senators who would be
voting on her confirmation that she could be characterized as an originalist
in a certain, limited sense, but not in the mold of Justice Scalia or Justice
Thomas.75 Rather than regarding a judge as constrained by the original
understanding (or original expected application) of a constitutional
provision, she expressed her belief that the meaning of the Constitution
changes over time, as each generation of Americans seeks to perfect
constitutional ideals that were originally articulated by the Founders.76
They perfect these ideals in part by broadening the universe of
beneficiaries—for example, by according women the respect and
opportunities they are due as full-fledged members of the political
community.
In a similar vein, Justice Ginsburg has noted approvingly that Justice
Thurgood Marshall “celebrated how our fundamental instrument of
government had evolved over the span of two centuries,” not “what the
Constitution was in the beginning.”77 Yet she has taken care to “appreciate,
too, that the equal dignity of individuals is part of the constitutional legacy,
shaped and bequeathed to us by the framers, in a most vital sense.”78 The
founders, she explained, “rebelled against the patriarchal power of kings
and the idea that political authority may legitimately rest on birth status.”79
Although their culture prevented them from fully understanding, let alone
realizing, the constitutional ideals that they espoused, “they stated a
commitment in the Declaration of Independence to equality and in the

74. Id.
75. Cf. Henry Paul Monaghan, Doing Originalism, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 32, 35-36, 38

(2004) (arguing that the originalism of Justice Ginsburg, unlike that of Justice Scalia, is
concerned with “historically constrained evolution,” according to which “[s]he looks for the
central purposes of the relevant constitutional provision and tries to apply it in a vastly
different world”).
76. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 587 (2005) (Stevens, J., joined by
Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“[T]hat our understanding of the Constitution does change from
time to time has been settled since John Marshall breathed life into its text.”).
77. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Foreword to SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND WOMEN’S
RIGHTS: MILESTONES IN EQUALITY xii (Clare Cushman ed., CQ Press 2001) (discussing
Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1987)) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Foreword].
78. Id.
79. Id.
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Declaration and Bill of Rights to individual liberty. Those commitments
had growth potential.”80 She has often invoked historian Richard Morris for
the proposition that
a prime portion of the history of the U.S. Constitution, and a
cause for celebration, is the story of the extension (through
amendment, judicial interpretation, and practice) of
constitutional rights and protections to once ignored or excluded
people: to humans who were once held in bondage, to men
without property, to the original inhabitants of the land that
became the United States, and to women.81

Affording “equal dignity”82 to all Americans, including historically
marginalized groups, constitutes the central purpose of Justice Ginsburg’s
constitutional vision. As I now show, this theme is powerfully present in
her responses to numerous constitutional questions, beginning (but not
ending) with equal protection doctrine.
A. Illustrations of Justice Ginsburg’s Vision
1.

Equal Protection—General

Equal protection is the area of constitutional law that arguably has
been of greatest concern to Justice Ginsburg in her roles as professor,
advocate, and judge. In the aforementioned discussion with students at
CUNY Law School, an audience member asked her what standard of
review she would apply in equal protection cases in an ideal world. She
rejected the notion that the Court mechanically relies on tiers of scrutiny,
stating that “[t]he labels are often rationalizations for results reached on
other grounds.”83 She thought, however, that there was an underlying
principle. She called it “the idea of essential human dignity, that we are all

80. Id. For a discussion of the import of Justice Ginsburg’s reference in the text to
individual liberty, see infra notes 218-221 and accompanying text.
81. Ginsburg, Foreword, supra note 77, at xii (quoting RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE
FORGING OF THE UNION, 1781-1789, at 193 (1987)); see Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a
Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1186-88 (1992) [hereinafter Speaking in a Judicial
Voice] (recording similar views); Ginsburg, supra note 50, at 265-66 (same); see also infra
note 95 (noting Justice Ginsburg’s invocation of Morris in United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515, 557 (1996)).
82. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
83. Ginsburg, supra note 51, at 238; accord Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones
Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV.
253, 269 (1999) (“I continue to view with suspicion endeavors to bundle the U.S. Supreme
Court’s equal protection decisions into neat packages under the headings ‘strict scrutiny,’
‘intermediate’ inspection, relaxed or ‘rational relationship’ review.”).
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people entitled to respect from our Government as persons of full human
stature, and must not be treated as lesser creatures.”84 “The notion of
essential human dignity,” she insisted, “is the driving force behind what we
place under the heading of equal protection.”85 Time and again, her
opinions reflect her embrace of this “underlying principle.”
2.

Equal Protection—Gender

In her role as founder and general counsel of the ACLU Women’s
Rights Project during the 1970s, Professor Ginsburg developed an effective
litigation strategy to combat sex discrimination. She sought to expose the
role of law in subordinating women by enforcing sex-role stereotypes of
the separate-spheres tradition, according to which men were expected to
perform as breadwinners and women were expected to perform as
economically dependent caregivers.86 But her legal advocacy on behalf of
women’s rights arguably did not find its fullest expression in the law until
the 1990s, when she was elevated to the Supreme Court.
In perhaps her most important majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg
rejected the Virginia Military Institute’s exclusion of women on the ground
that the Commonwealth of Virginia was constitutionally disabled from
regarding them as second-class citizens. “Through a century plus three
decades and more of [American] history,” she wrote for the Court, “women
did not count among voters composing ‘We the People.’”87 She noted that

84. Ginsburg, supra note 51, at 238.
85. Id. at 239.
86. See generally, e.g., AMY LEIGH CAMPBELL, RAISING THE BAR: RUTH BADER

GINSBURG AND THE ACLU WOMEN’S RIGHTS PROJECT (2003); Cary Franklin, The AntiStereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
(forthcoming April 2010); Serena Mayeri, Reconstructing the Race-Sex Analogy, 49 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1789 (2008). For Professor Ginsburg’s academic treatments of the subject at
the time, see generally, for example, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44
U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1975); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Benign Classification in
the Context of Sex, 10 CONN. L. REV. 813 (1978).
87. United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (“Today’s skeptical
scrutiny of official action denying rights or opportunities based on sex responds to volumes
of history.”). For an insightful analysis of Justice Ginsburg’s use of discredited history as
“negative precedent” in VMI, see generally Deborah A. Widiss, Note, Re-viewing History:
The Use of the Past as Negative Precedent in United States v. Virginia, 108 YALE L.J. 237
(1998).
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since Reed v. Reed,88 “the Court has repeatedly recognized that neither
federal nor state government acts compatibly with the equal protection
principle when a law or official policy denies to women, simply because
they are women, full citizenship stature—equal opportunity to aspire,
achieve, participate in and contribute to society based on their individual
talents and capacities.”89 While Virginia’s plan to afford a unique
educational benefit only to males “serves the Commonwealth’s sons,” she
wrote, “it makes no provision whatever for her daughters. That is not equal
protection.”90 In the view now of seven Justices, including Chief Justice
Rehnquist,91 VMI’s mission to produce “citizen soldiers” certainly “is great

88. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Ginsburg played a pivotal role in litigating Reed. See LINDA
GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN’S SUPREME COURT
JOURNEY 209 (2005). As Ms. Greenhouse noted:

In one of the earliest cases, Reed v. Reed, the Court was asked to
invalidate an Idaho law that gave automatic preference to men over
women in being selected as administrators of estates. Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, then a law professor and an attorney for the American Civil
Liberties Union’s Women’s Rights Project, worked on the brief for the
appellant, Sally Reed, although she did not argue the case.
Id.; see also Rebecca L. Barnhart & Deborah Zalesne, Twin Pillars of Judicial Philosophy:
The Impact of the Ginsburg Collegiality and Gender Discrimination Principles on Her
Separate Opinions Involving Gender Discrimination, 7 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 275, 280 (2004)
(“Although the Court did not apply a higher level of scrutiny to sex-based classifications,
Ginsburg had planted the seed, and the Reed brief would become known as the
‘Grandmother Brief’ because it contained the legal arguments for all subsequent gender
discrimination cases.”).
89. VMI, 518 U.S. at 532.
90. Id. at 540.
91. For further evidence of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s movement over the decades in the
area of sex discrimination, see Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736-40
(2003) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (upholding the family-care leave provision of the Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) as a valid exercise of Congress’ power under Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to combat unconstitutional sex discrimination).
Commentators have noted the magnitude of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s shift in position from
his early days on the Court to VMI and then Hibbs. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Learning to
Listen to Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 7 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 213, 218-19 (2004); Deborah Jones
Merritt & David M. Lieberman, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Jurisprudence of Opportunity and
Equality, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 39, 47 (2004); Reva B. Siegel, You’ve Come A Long Way,
Baby: Rehnquist’s New Approach to Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REV.
1871-98 (2006). The evolution of the late Chief Justice’s views on sex discrimination is as
striking as the development of his relationship with Justice Ginsburg is endearing. During
my year in her chambers, I witnessed the respect and devotion with which she referred to
him as “the Chief” or “my Chief.” See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 50, at 267-68 (discussing,
inter alia, the change in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s views on sex discrimination and referring
to him as “my now Chief”).
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enough to accommodate women, who today count as citizens in our
American democracy equal in stature to men.”92
Turning from the question of liability to the issue of remedy, Justice
Ginsburg deemed constitutionally inadequate Virginia’s offer of a separate
and unequal substitute that brought to mind the new Texas law school
deemed insufficient in Sweatt v. Painter.93 The very comparison to Sweatt
underscored her view of the dominant social meaning of VMI’s exclusion
of women. While previous generations of Americans were untroubled by
VMI’s admissions policy,94 this fact was not decisive. Invoking historian
Richard Morris,95 she wrote that “VMI’s story continued as our
comprehension of ‘We the People’ expanded.”96 She perceived “no reason
to believe that the admission of women capable of all the activities required
of VMI cadets would destroy the Institute rather than enhance its capacity
to serve the ‘more perfect Union.’”97 In her judgment, and in the judgment
of the Court she helped to persuade, the Union becomes more perfect as
our Constitution’s comprehension of “We the People” broadens to include
women.
Notably, Justice Ginsburg seemed to problematize the Court’s use of
tiers of scrutiny in equal protection cases: she required “an exceedingly
persuasive justification”98 for government action on the basis of gender, a
standard that seemed closer to strict scrutiny than to intermediate

92. VMI, 518 U.S. at 545.
93. Id. at 553, 557 (citing Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633-34 (1950)) (comparing

Virginia’s proposed solution to the remedy proposed by Texas in Sweatt).
94. See id. at 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Much of the Court’s opinion is devoted to
deprecating the closed-mindedness of our forebears with regard to women’s education, and
even with regard to the treatment of women in areas that have nothing to do with
education.”).
95. See supra text accompanying note 81 (quoting Ginsburg’s invocation of Morris).
96. VMI, 518 U.S. at 557 (footnote and citations omitted) (referencing MORRIS, supra
note 81, at 193).
97. Id. at 558.
98. Id. at 531. See id. at 571 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting “[t]he Court’s nine
invocations of that phrase”).
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scrutiny.99 Yet she was careful to maintain the law’s distinction between
practices of exclusion and inclusion. “‘Inherent differences’ between men
and women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but
not for denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints
on an individual’s opportunity.”100 Justice Ginsburg explained that “[s]ex
classifications may be used to compensate women ‘for particular economic
disabilities [they have] suffered,’101 to ‘promot[e] equal employment
opportunity,’102 to advance full development of the talent and capacities of
our Nation’s people.’”103 But, she underscored, “such classifications may
not be used, as they once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and
economic inferiority of women.”104 As legal historian Serena Mayeri has
written, “[p]romoting women’s advancement and equal participation in the
society, the polity, and the economy was, Ginsburg essentially declared, an
‘exceedingly persuasive justification.’”105
3.

Abortion

The ideal of equal citizenship stature animates Justice Ginsburg’s
approach to the permissibility of government regulation of abortion. In her
controversial critique of Roe v. Wade,106 she wrote that “the shape of the
law on gender-based classification and reproductive autonomy indicates
and influences the opportunity women will have to participate as men’s full

99. This language originated in earlier cases. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,
511 U.S. 127, 136-37 & n.6 (1994); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724
(1982); Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979). In VMI, however, Chief
Justice Rehnquist insisted that these decisions used the language to describe the difficulty of
meeting the standard of review, not the standard of review itself. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 559
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment). Justice Scalia was substantially more harsh in his
criticism. See, e.g., id. at 573 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Only the amorphous ‘exceedingly
persuasive justification’ phrase, and not the standard elaboration of intermediate scrutiny,
can be made to yield this conclusion that VMI’s single-sex composition is unconstitutional
because there exist several women . . . willing and able to undertake VMI’s program.”).
100. VMI, 518 U.S. at 533.
101. Id. (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977) (per curiam)).
102. Id. (quoting Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987)).
103. Id. at 533-34.
104. Id. at 534 (citing Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948)).
105. Mayeri, supra note 86, at 1851. For a recent, forceful explication of Justice
Ginsburg’s views on sex discrimination, see AT&T Corporation v. Hulteen, 129 S.Ct. 1962,
1978-80 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
106. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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partners in the nation’s social, political, and economic life.”107 Similarly,
she insisted that “[a]lso in the balance is a woman’s autonomous charge of
her full life’s course . . . her ability to stand in relation to man, society, and
the state as an independent, self-sustaining, equal citizen.”108 Her analysis
of the abortion question thus focused primarily not on the right to privacy,
but on the “woman’s equality aspect” to reproductive rights, the “equalregard values involved in cases on abortion.”109
Justice Ginsburg reaffirmed her approach to restrictive abortion
regulations more than two decades later, in her dissent in Gonzales v.
Carhart.110 The five-Justice majority rejected a facial challenge to the
federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, even though the statute
lacked the health exception that the Court in Stenberg v. Carhart111 had
held was required under Planned Parenthood v. Casey.112 Dissenting,
Justice Ginsburg wrote that “legal challenges to undue restrictions on
abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some generalized notion of
privacy; rather, they center on a woman’s autonomy to determine her life’s
course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature.”113
Justice Ginsburg wrote with uncharacteristic anger. She insisted that
the Court’s treatment of the medical evidence was “in undisguised conflict
with Stenberg,”114 and that the statute did not advance the government’s
interest in protecting fetal life because “[t]he law saves not a single fetus
from destruction, for it targets only a method of performing abortion.”115
She further insisted that it is “‘simply irrational’” to regard the banned
procedure as warranting state intervention to a greater extent than the most

107. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe
v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 375 (1985) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on
Autonomy and Equality]. See Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, supra note 81, at
1198-209 (further critiquing Roe).
108. Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality, supra note 107, at 383.
109. Id. at 385.
110. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). See Cass R. Sunstein, Editorial, Ginsburg’s Dissent May Yet
Prevail, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2007, at A31 (noting that in Gonzales v. Carhart, Justice
Ginsburg “attempted to reconceive the foundations of the abortion right, basing it on wellestablished constitutional principles of equality”).
111. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
112. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
113. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Reva Siegel,
Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions
of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992); Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and the
Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1002-28 (1984)).
114. Id. at 1646.
115. Id. at 1647.
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common method of second-trimester, previability abortion, and that the
Court “dishonors our precedent” by allowing “moral concerns” to
“overrid[e] fundamental rights.”116
Justice Ginsburg seemed most provoked by the Court’s invocation of
“an antiabortion shibboleth for which it concededly has no reliable
evidence: Women who have abortions come to regret their choices.”117 She
skewered the Court’s fear that doctors might withhold information about
the nature of the banned procedure “[b]ecause of women’s fragile
emotional state and because of the ‘bond of love the mother has for her
child.’”118 She noted incredulously that “[t]he solution the Court approves,
then, is not to require doctors to inform women, accurately and adequately,
of the different procedures and their attendant risks,”119 but to “depriv[e]
women of the right to make an autonomous choice, even at the expense of
their safety.”120 The Court’s “way of thinking,” she charged while
explicitly invoking the Court’s equal protection precedents, “reflects
ancient notions about women’s place in the family and under the
Constitution—ideas that have long since been discredited.”121 In effect,
Justice Ginsburg concluded that banning an abortion procedure for the
gender-paternalistic reasons offered by the majority violated the Equal
Protection Clause.122
Justice Ginsburg would have invalidated the statute on its face
because “the absence of a health exception burdens all women for whom it
is relevant—women who, in the judgment of their doctors, require [the
banned procedure] because other procedures would place their health at
risk.”123 Concluding with extraordinary bluntness, she wrote that “the
Court, differently composed than it was when we last considered a
restrictive abortion regulation, is hardly faithful to our earlier invocations

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 1648.
Id. at 1634 (majority opinion).
Gonzales, 127 S.Ct. at 1648-49 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1649.
Id. Justice Ginsburg compared Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422-23 (1908) and
Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring), with United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 542, n.12 (1996), and Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S.
199, 207 (1977). Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
122. For development of this argument, see Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of
Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L.
REV. 991 (2007).
123. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1651 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg also
asserted that the Court “offers no clue” regarding what an appropriate as-applied challenge
“might look like.” Id.
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of ‘the rule of law’ and the ‘principles of stare decisis.’”124 She thought
“the Act, and the Court’s defense of it, cannot be understood as anything
other than an effort to chip away at a right declared again and again by this
Court—and with increasing comprehension of its centrality to women’s
lives.”125
In Gonzales v. Carhart, Justice Ginsburg viewed the statute under
review as threatening the equal citizenship of American women. Indeed,
she explicitly invoked the impediments to “‘women’s progress toward full
citizenship stature throughout our Nation’s history” that she underscored on
behalf of the Court in United States v. Virginia.126 And from her
perspective, what enabled this significant change in the constitutional law
of abortion likely added insult to injury: Justice Alito’s replacement of
Justice O’Connor left her, at that time, as the lone remaining woman on the
Court.
4.

Equal Protection—Race

As suggested by her invocation of Sweatt in VMI, Justice Ginsburg’s
commitment to equal citizenship stature orients her equal protection
jurisprudence in the area of racial equality. Indeed, in race cases she has
urged the same distinction between keeping a door closed and opening it
that she has drawn in gender cases. She also has viewed mechanical
application of the tiers of scrutiny as impeding realization of the
Constitution’s equality command.
Justice Ginsburg has insisted that the Constitution properly accounts
for the difference between the logic of racial subordination and the logic of
race-conscious remedy. In implementing the “equality instruction” of the
Equal Protection Clause, she urged in her dissent in Gratz v. Bollinger,127
“government decisionmakers may properly distinguish between policies of
exclusion and inclusion.”128 She asserted that “[a]ctions designed to burden
groups long denied full citizenship stature are not sensibly ranked with
measures taken to hasten the day when entrenched discrimination and its
aftereffects have been extirpated.”129
In line with this substantive understanding of equality, Justice
Ginsburg reminded the Nation in Gratz that “we are not far distant from an
overtly discriminatory past, and the effects of centuries of law-sanctioned

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 1652.
Id. at 1653.
Id. at 1649 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 542 n.12 (1996)).
539 U.S. 244 (2003).
Id. at 301 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
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inequality remain painfully evident in our communities and schools.”130
She further noted that “[t]he racial and ethnic groups to which the College
accords special consideration (African-Americans, Hispanics, and NativeAmericans) historically have been relegated to inferior status by law and
social practice,” and “their members continue to experience class-based
discrimination to this day.”131 Similarly, she observed in her concurring
opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger132 that “it was only 25 years before Bakke
that this Court declared public school segregation unconstitutional, a
declaration that, after prolonged resistance, yielded an end to a lawenforced racial caste system, itself the legacy of centuries of slavery.”133
In Justice Ginsburg’s view, the institution of affirmative action in
higher education seeks to redress past (and present) racial discrimination
and its manifold social consequences, thereby promoting equal citizenship
stature.134 She views similarly the practice of affirmative action in other
settings, as she suggested in her dissenting opinion in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Peña.135 And she places in the same category the postBrown project of racially integrating America’s public schools, whether

130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 298.
Id. at 303.
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
Id. at 345 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978)).
134. Remedial logic also pervades the reasoning of Justices who expressly speak the
language of “diversity” in affirmative action cases. See, e.g., Post, supra note 39, at 63, 74;
Neil S. Siegel, Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans: Balkanization, Integration, and
Individualized Consideration, 56 DUKE L.J. 781, 790-800 (2006).
135. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Justice Ginsburg wrote in this government contracting case:
Those effects [of past racial discrimination], reflective of a system of
racial caste only recently ended, are evident in our workplaces, markets,
and neighborhoods. Job applicants with identical resumes,
qualifications, and interview styles still experience different receptions,
depending on their race. White and African American consumers still
encounter different deals. People of color looking for housing still face
discriminatory treatment by landlords, real estate agents, and mortgage
lenders. Minority entrepreneurs sometimes fail to gain contracts though
they are the low bidders, and they are sometimes refused work even
after winning contracts.
Bias both conscious and unconscious,
reflecting traditional and unexamined habits of thought, keeps up
barriers that must come down if equal opportunity and
nondiscrimination are ever genuinely to become this country’s law and
practice.
Id. at 273-74 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (footnotes and citations omitted).
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through court order or through voluntary efforts by local communities.136
For her, efforts to secure equal citizenship stature implicate precisely the
opposite purposes, effects, and social meanings of the brutal practices of
racial subordination that prevailed throughout most of American history.137
Accordingly, Justice Ginsburg’s approach to race cases, like her
approach in VMI, may be understood as a measured effort to destabilize the
doctrinal constraints imposed by the tiers of scrutiny. While in VMI she
endeavored to ramp up the level of scrutiny because she confronted a
classification that she deemed invidious,138 in race cases she has tended to
dial down the degree of judicial skepticism because she has tended to
confront classifications that she deems benign.139 In Grutter, she went out
of her way to record that the case presented no occasion “to revisit whether
all governmental classifications by race, whether designed to benefit or to
burden a historically disadvantaged group, should be subject to the same
standard of judicial review.”140 In Gratz, she insisted that race is not
“inevitably an impermissible classification.”141
So too in Adarand. In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg read the lead
opinion as requiring a “fatal” brand of strict scrutiny “for classifications
burdening groups that have suffered discrimination in our society,” but as

136. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2836
(2007) (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, & Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“For Brown held
out a promise. It was a promise embodied in three Amendments designed to make citizens
of slaves. It was the promise of true racial equality—not as a matter of fine words on paper,
but as a matter of everyday life in the Nation’s cities and schools.”).
137. For a classic focus on the purposes, effects, and social meanings of a practice as
determinative under equal protection analysis, see Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of
the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 426 (1960) (“Can a system which, in all that
can be measured, has practiced the grossest inequality, actually have been ‘equal’ in intent,
in total social meaning and impact? ‘Thy speech maketh thee manifest . . .’; segregation, in
all visible things, speaks only haltingly any dialect but that of inequality.”).
138. In VMI, Justice Ginsburg seemed to regard elevation of the level of scrutiny applied
to sex classifications that enforce traditional sex-role stereotypes as the doctrinal expression
of women’s own elevation in American society. See 518 U.S. at 531. What is more, she
intimated more than once that the elevation of both was not yet complete. See id. at 532 &
n.6 (summarizing “the Court’s current directions for cases of official classification based on
gender,” and noting that “[t]he Court has thus far reserved most stringent judicial scrutiny
for classifications based on race or national origin . . . .” (emphases added)).
139. But see Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 516 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(reaffirming her “conviction that the same standard of review ought not control judicial
inspection of every official race classification,” but agreeing that a state policy of racial
segregation in prisons “warrants rigorous scrutiny”).
140. 539 U.S. at 346 n.* (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
141. 539 U.S. at 301 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Nowalk Core v. Norwalk
Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931-32 (2d Cir. 1968)).
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rejecting the notion that strict scrutiny is “‘fatal in fact’” for “a
classification made to hasten the day when ‘we are just one race.’”142
Significantly, she referenced the “Court’s once-lax review of sex-based
classifications” as justifying “searching” review even of the ostensibly
virtuous variety of racial classifications, “in order to ferret out
classifications in reality malign, but masquerading as benign.”143 The link
between her past work as a champion of women’s rights and her present
work as a guarantor of racial equality was express in the United States
Reports.144
5.

Equal Protection—Disability

Justice Ginsburg is guided by equal-citizenship concerns in
considering questions of equal protection for disabled Americans. In this
context, too, she focuses on ending historic practices of exclusion and
taking relevant differences into account. Here as well, her work as a
women’s rights advocate has had a profound influence on the approach she
has taken.145
Indeed, disability issues were not new to Justice Ginsburg when she
encountered them as a judge: much of her early work as a legal advocate
was concerned with pregnancy, which can interfere with the performance
of certain job functions. From the beginning, and particularly in her
undernoticed merits brief in Struck v. Secretary of Defense,146 Justice
Ginsburg has viewed discrimination against pregnant women as a core case
142.
143.
144.
145.

515 U.S. at 275 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Id.
See Mayeri, supra note 86, at 1850-53.
See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Justice Ginsburg and the Judicial Role in Expanding “We
the People”: The Disability Rights Cases, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 49, 56 (2004) (“[T]he
critique of paternalism that lies at the core of disability rights thinking has much in common
with—and was surely influenced by—the women’s movement’s own attack on paternalistic
practices that limited women’s opportunities, an attack exemplified by then-Professor
Ginsburg’s litigation agenda throughout the 1970s.”).
146. See Brief for Petitioner at 7, Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 409 U.S. 1071 (1972) (No. 72178). This brief has been underappreciated in part because the Court declined to hear the
merits of the case. It also has been “neglected,” Reva B. Siegel, Comments, in WHAT ROE V.
WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S MOST
CONTROVERSIAL DECISION 245 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005), because the Court subsequently
rejected an equal protection challenge to a pregnancy discrimination claim. Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (upholding a California law that provided workers with
comprehensive disability insurance for all temporarily disabling conditions that might
prevent them from working, except pregnancy). For an attempt to recover the Struck brief,
see generally Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Struck by Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsburg
on Pregnancy Discrimination As Sex Discrimination, 59 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming January
2010).
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of sex discrimination.147 In Struck, she represented an Air Force officer,
Captain Susan Struck, whose pregnancy—and whose refusal on religious
grounds to have an abortion—subjected her to automatic discharge from
military service. In her brief, Professor Ginsburg insisted that a key barrier
to women’s full participation in American society was not pregnancy, but
our society’s historic response to it: “Discharge for pregnancy, attended by
termination of income and fringe benefits, and denial of the right to return
after childbirth, disables these women far more than their temporary
physical condition.”148 This argument, and her submission in Struck that the
status quo is not neutral—that certain “practices operate as ‘built-in
headwinds’ that drastically curtail women’s opportunities”149—foreshadow
fundamental arguments of the contemporary disability rights movement.
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court in Olmstead v. L.C.,150 which
held that unnecessary institutionalization of people with disabilities often
constitutes “discrimination” prohibited by Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990,151 has been called the “Brown v. Board of
Education of the disability rights movement” by disability rights
activists.152 According to Sam Bagenstos, a former Ginsburg clerk, “the
Justice’s contributions to the legal acceptance of the disability rights
movement promise to aid significantly in the achievement of equal
citizenship for people with disabilities in this country.”153 Professor
Bagenstos stresses Justice Ginsburg’s endorsement of the view of disability
rights activists that “disability was neither a personal tragedy nor a source
of inspiration for the nondisabled; disability was a minority-group status
imposed by a society that was not accessible to individuals with physical or
mental impairments that deviated too far from ‘the norm.’”154 From this
perspective, a sidewalk without curb cuts is not neutral, nor is a courthouse

147. Recounting “Capt. Susan Struck’s story” during her Supreme Court confirmation
hearing, then-Judge Ginsburg sought “to explain how my own thinking developed on this
issue [of sex discrimination, and it came out of] a case involving a woman’s choice for birth
rather than the termination of her pregnancy.” Hearings Before the Committee on the
Judiciary: The Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States, 103d Cong. 205 (1993). She identified “the Struck brief” as
“mark[ing] the time when I first thought long and hard about this question.” Id. at 206.
148. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 146, at 37.
149. Id. at 35 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (footnote
omitted)).
150. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
151. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1210112213 (2000)); see also Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 587.
152. Bagenstos, supra note 145, at 49.
153. Id. at 50.
154. Id. at 51.
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without an elevator. Moreover, people who use wheelchairs are not
inherently disabled; rather, they are rendered disabled by their inaccessible
environment.
During the October 2003 Term, Justice Ginsburg reaffirmed her
commitment to viewing disability in this way. Concurring in the Court’s
decision to uphold congressional power to enact part of Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, she wrote in Tennessee v. Lane that the ADA “is a
measure expected to advance equal-citizenship stature for persons with
disabilities.”155 According to Ginsburg, “Congress understood in shaping
the ADA” that “[i]ncluding individuals with disabilities among people who
count in composing ‘We the People’ . . . would sometimes require not
blindfolded equality, but responsiveness to difference; not indifference, but
accommodation.”156 The Lane Court, she concluded, was “faithful to the
Act’s demand for reasonable accommodation to secure access and avoid
exclusion.”157
6.

Federalism

Justice Ginsburg’s approach to federalism cases is informed by her
inclusive constitutional vision. Specifically, she defends broad government
power to secure equal citizenship for once-excluded or otherwise
vulnerable Americans.158 In United States v. Morrison,159 for example, she
had little difficulty concluding that Congress possessed ample authority
under the Commerce Clause to enact part of the Violence Against Women
Act of 1994 (VAWA),160 which provided a federal civil remedy for the
victims of gender-motivated violence.161
Similarly, her Lane concurrence addressed some of the federalism
concerns underlying the Rehnquist Court’s Section 5 jurisprudence. She
wrote that “[l]egislation calling upon all government actors to respect the

155. 541 U.S. 509, 536 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Samuel R. Bagenstos,
Surbordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 471 (2000)).
156. Id. at 536.
157. Id. at 537.
158. I shall not canvass Justice Ginsburg’s views on federalism in every significant area
of constitutional law. A comprehensive survey would include discussion of her approaches
to the Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amendment, the Eleventh Amendment, the enforcement
clauses of the Civil War Amendments, preemption, and the dormant Commerce Clause.
159. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
161. Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Souter’s dissent in full and Justice Breyer’s dissent
in part. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 655 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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dignity of individuals with disabilities is entirely compatible with our
Constitution’s commitment to federalism, properly conceived.”162 This was
so, she explained, because it is “not conducive to a harmonious federal
system to require Congress, before it exercises authority under [Section] 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, essentially to indict each State for
disregarding the equal-citizenship stature of persons with disabilities.”163
Noting that “[m]embers of Congress are understandably reluctant to
condemn their own States as constitutional violators, complicit in
maintaining the isolated and unequal status of persons with disabilities[,]”
she thought it inappropriate to “disarm a National Legislature for resisting
an adversarial approach to lawmaking better suited to the courtroom.”164
She deemed the record of exclusion before Congress “sufficed to warrant
the barrier-lowering, dignity-respecting national solution the People’s
representatives in Congress elected to order.”165
By contrast, Justice Ginsburg invoked federalism concerns of her own
in her dissent in Bush v. Gore,166 insisting in an extraordinary case upon the
“ordinary principle” that federal courts defer to a state high court’s
interpretation of state law.167 She rejected Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
implicit comparison of the Florida Supreme Court’s conduct to the massive
resistance of state supreme courts during the Civil Rights Movement.
Whereas those courts sought to undermine the U.S. Supreme Court’s
insistence in Brown v. Board of Education upon the equal citizenship
stature of African Americans,168 “the Florida Supreme Court “concluded
that counting every legal vote was the overriding concern of the Florida
legislature when it enacted the State’s Election Code. The court surely
should not be bracketed with state high courts of the Jim Crow South.”169
These few cases hardly capture most, let alone all, of Justice
Ginsburg’s relevant views on constitutional federalism.170 But they do
suggest that her constitutional vision influences her approach to cases with

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Lane, 541 U.S. at 537.
Id.
Id. at 537-38.
Id. at 538.
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
Id. at 142 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Bush, 531 U.S. at 141.
For example, Justice Ginsburg is among the Justices least likely to conclude that
federal law preempts state law. See, e.g,. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008)
(holding 8-1 that the Medical Device Act’s preemption clause bars common-law claims
challenging the safety or effectiveness of a medical device marketed in a form that received
pre-market approval from the FDA). Justice Ginsburg was the sole dissenter.
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federalism components. Her assessment of federalism-based objections to
government action appears to be informed by the extent to which such
action advances or impedes equal-citizenship concerns.
7.

Additional Instances

The ideal of equal citizenship stature animates Justice Ginsburg’s
approach to central areas of constitutional law. This commitment accounts
for the general views on constitutional change that she expressed during her
confirmation hearing; her addendum to Justice Marshall’s stated view of
the original Constitution; her basic approach to the Equal Protection Clause
that she noted in her conversation with students at CUNY Law School; her
views on gender discrimination that culminated in her majority opinion in
VMI; her resistance to burdensome regulations of abortion, which she
viewed as a form of gender discrimination in criticizing the Court in Roe
and Gonzales v. Carhart; her substantive understanding of the
Constitution’s commitment to racial equality in cases such as Grutter,
Gratz, and Adarand; her conception of constitutional equality for disabled
Americans in cases such as Olmstead and Lane; and the views on
federalism that she expressed in the dissent she joined in Morrison, her
concurring opinion in Lane, and her dissent in Bush v. Gore.
These examples are illustrative, not exhaustive. I will suggest a few
additional illustrations without developing them. Justice Ginsburg
understands discrimination against homosexuals to implicate basic
questions of equal citizenship stature.171 Likewise, her defense of a strict
wall of separation between church and state seems animated by equalcitizenship concerns. She has concluded that “the aim of the Establishment
Clause is genuinely to uncouple government from church . . . .”172
According to this view of the Clause, a robustly separationist approach—

171. Justice Ginsburg was in the majority in both Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003), and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), and she dissented in Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). The majority opinion in Lawrence defended the
dignity of intimate homosexual relationships and underscored the state’s lack of authority to
demean homosexuals. See 539 U.S. at 567, 575, 578; see also infra note 218 and
accompanying text (quoting some of the language from Lawrence and noting Justice
Ginsburg’s subsequent invocation of this language).
172. Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 817-18 (1995)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947)).
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one that maintains a secular public space173—disables government from
threatening the equal social status of citizens who may not support the
religious practices advanced, endorsed, or coerced by government.174
The ideal of full human stature also helps to account for Justice
Ginsburg’s votes in cases implicating the potential tradeoff between liberty
and security in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.175 A
Justice whose basic approach to constitutional law is oriented around the
ideal of essential human dignity, of full human stature, might be expected
to respond skeptically to a President’s assertion that there are, in effect, no
judicially enforceable constitutional limits on his authority to declare
someone an “enemy combatant” and to indefinitely detain the individual or
try him before a military commission.176 Such a Justice might also be
expected to attend to evolving standards of decency in determining whether
imposition of the death penalty in certain circumstances shows sufficient
respect for human dignity.177
To offer just one more example, Justice Ginsburg has herself tied her
support for what she calls “a comparative perspective in constitutional
adjudication” to her broader constitutional vision.178 She has criticized the
“notion that it is improper to look beyond the borders of the United States
in grappling with hard questions” as “in line with the view of the U.S.
Constitution as a document essentially frozen in time as of the date of its

173. In Pinette, Justice Ginsburg endorsed the argument in Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 197-214 (1992), that the “negative
bar against establishment of religion implies affirmative establishment of secular public
order.” 515 U.S. at 817.
174. For a different perspective from another Democratic appointee on the Court, see Van
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 704 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). “[T]o reach
a contrary conclusion here, based primarily on the religious nature of the tablets’ text would,
I fear, lead the law to exhibit a hostility toward religion that has no place in our
Establishment Clause traditions.” Id.
175. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004);
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
176. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (quoting relevant public statements of
Justice Ginsburg). In each of the cases listed in the previous note, Justice Ginsburg voted in
favor of detainees who alleged that they were being held or tried illegally.
177. Justice Ginsburg was in the majority in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641
(2008), Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002).
178. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. J., U.S. Supreme Court, Speech at the Constitutional
Court of South Africa, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”: The Value of a
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication (Feb. 7, 2006) (transcript available
at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_02-07b-06.html (last visited Feb.
14, 2009)).
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ratification.”179 In her view, “U.S. jurists honor the Framers’ intent ‘to
create a more perfect Union,’ . . . if they read the Constitution as belonging
to a global 21st century, not as fixed forever by 18th-century
understandings.”180 Just as the United States has had much to offer the
world in broadening “a decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind”181 to
include respect for the opinions of “[Human]kind,”182 so Justice Ginsburg
believes that other countries can help Americans to perfect the Union. They
can do so, among other ways, by providing different perspectives on who
ought to count (and how) in (re)constituting “We the People.” “We are the
losers,” she maintains, “if we neglect what others can tell us about
endeavors to eradicate bias against women, minorities, and other
disadvantaged groups.”183 This is because “irrational prejudice and rank
discrimination are infectious in our world,” and because “. . . the
determination to counter it, we all share.”184
This was apparently one of the lessons that Professor Ginsburg
learned during her stay in Sweden in the early 1960s. It is widely known
that she learned Swedish and co-authored a book on Swedish judicial
procedure.185 It is less commonly understood that she also was exposed to
perspectives that would significantly influence her approach to the problem

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
Ginsburg, supra note 178.
Ginsburg & Merritt, supra note 83, at 282.
Id.; see also, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of
a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 329,
336 (2004) (noting that in her Grutter concurrence, 539 U.S. at 344, she discussed two
United Nations Conventions that “distinguish between impermissible policies of oppression
and exclusion, and permissible policies of inclusion”); id. at 337 (forecasting that the Court
will continue to take a comparative perspective in constitutional litigation in part “in a spirit
of humility” because, “in Justice O’Connor’s words: ‘Other legal systems continue to
innovate, to experiment, and to find new solutions to the new legal problems that arise each
day, from which we can learn and benefit.’” (quoting Sandra Day O’Connor, Broadening
Our Horizons: Why American Judges and Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law, INT’L
JUD. OBSERVER, June 1997, at 2)).
185. See, e.g., Rebecca Mae Salokar, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in WOMEN IN LAW 78, 80
(Rebecca Mae Salokar & Mary L. Volcansek eds., 1996) (“Following her clerkship,
Ginsburg was invited to participate as a research associate on a comparative legal studies
project funded by the Carnegie Foundation through Columbia University. She seized the
opportunity to travel to Sweden to study its legal and judicial system and there, by
coincidence, she witnessed the beginnings of a feminist movement. But the young Mrs.
Ginsburg was not yet attuned to the legal concerns of women. The comparative studies
project resulted in two co-authored books on Swedish law, and to this day, Ginsburg
maintains her academic interest in that country’s laws and judicial system.”).
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of sex discrimination in America.186 As Cary Franklin explains in an
important forthcoming article, “Ginsburg derived the anti-stereotyping
principle in part from the philosophy of John Stuart Mill and the law and
politics of Sweden, which began in the early 1960s to wage an ambitious,
decades-long campaign against sex-role enforcement.”187
Specifically, the Swedish anti-stereotyping ideals that would
powerfully impact Professor Ginsburg went far beyond insisting on formal
equality between the sexes. “[J]ämställdhet,” as this Swedish theory of
gender equality was known, rested on the belief that “sex classifications
were often necessary in order to break down traditional conceptions of men
and women’s roles; their aim was not to eliminate formal sex
classifications but to liberate both sexes from prescriptive sex
stereotypes.”188 According to Franklin, it was primarily for this reason, and
not because of strategic considerations or a commitment to formal equality,
that Professor Ginsburg represented male plaintiffs in several of the cases
she litigated.189 Justice Ginsburg’s internationalism and her sex
discrimination jurisprudence are thus tied together in interesting ways—
ways that are integrated by her inclusive constitutional vision.
B. Reflections on Justice Ginsburg’s Vision
The foregoing illustrations reveal that Justice Ginsburg uses the
phrase “equal citizenship stature” in a variety of settings, suggesting that it
captures ideas that are central to her understanding of the Constitution’s
objectives. To be sure, she has invoked the phrase most frequently in equal
protection cases, which may be unsurprising because this is an area of
constitutional law in which she has been especially concerned to secure
doctrinal change.190 But as I have endeavored to show, her concern with
equal citizenship transcends her engagement with the Equal Protection

186. See generally Franklin, supra note 86 (arguing that the sex equality revolution
Ginsburg witnessed in Sweden in the 1960s strongly influenced her approach to sex
discrimination law in the United States).
187. Id. at 4; see id. at 12 (“Ginsburg’s immersion in Swedish law and culture in the
1960s would have a profound impact on her subsequent career as a legal feminist and
Supreme Court litigator.”).
188. Id. at 17.
189. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Moritz v. Comm’r of
Internal Revenue, 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972). For an illuminating (and characteristically
humorous) account of how the Ginsburgs stumbled upon the Moritz case, see Martin D.
Ginsburg, A Uniquely Distinguished Service, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 173 (2007).
190. Cf. Baer, supra note 68, at 222 (“She has actively promoted change, at least in equal
protection doctrine . . . .”).
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Clause. She has been applying to several groups and areas of constitutional
law the same vision that she initially developed in her work as an advocate
on behalf of women’s rights during the 1970s.191
The foregoing examples reveal something else that is important about
Justice Ginsburg’s constitutional vision. She often invokes the ideal of
equal citizenship stature interchangeably with references to “equal dignity,”
“essential human dignity,” and “full human stature.” In her public
utterances, these phrases appear to convey essentially the same meaning.
This observation permits three further reflections about the content of
Justice Ginsburg’s constitutional vision.
First, Justice Ginsburg’s concern with “stature,” or social status,
indicates that her vision is infused with antisubordination values.192 Her
primary focus of constitutional concern is on historically marginalized
groups; she insists that it is wrong for government to reinforce their inferior
social status.193 In accordance with this insistence, she has sharply
distinguished between efforts to exclude such groups from institutions or
opportunities in American society, and efforts to include them by
overcoming the continuing effects of past (and present) societal
discrimination and taking relevant differences into account. In equal
protection cases, she has operationalized this distinction by applying
vigorous judicial scrutiny only to exclusionary practices, thereby
destabilizing the doctrinal division of the Equal Protection Clause into
three tiers of scrutiny. In her view, rigid adherence to the tiers thwarts the
vindication of antisbordination values, particularly “[t]he moral insistence
that the low be raised up—that the forces of subordination be named,
accused, disestablished, and dissolved.”194

191. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 50, at 266 (noting that “in the 1970s,” her “major
work . . . was to help advance the vibrant idea of the equal stature and dignity of men and
women as a matter of constitutional principle”).
192. For discussions of the antisubordination understanding of equal protection, see
CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32, 38 (1987); Owen M. Fiss,
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 151 (1976); Siegel,
supra note 57, at 1472-76; see also Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil
Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2003);
Jill Elaine Hasday, The Principle and Practice of Women’s “Full Citizenship”: A Case
Study of Sex-Segregated Public Education, 101 MICH. L. REV. 755, 769-79 (2002).
193. See Siegel, supra note 57, at 1472-73 (defining “the antisubordination principle” as
“the conviction that it is wrong for the state to engage in practices that enforce the inferior
social status of historically oppressed groups”).
194. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 192, at 32.
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While some feminist legal scholars have charged Justice Ginsburg
with excessive formalism in the area of gender equality,195 the foregoing
analysis suggests that her constitutional vision is more substantive than
formal, and always has been. Critically, her selection in 1972 of a pregnant
plaintiff to advance the equal protection claims of women illustrates that
she is no formalist.196 In her merits brief in Struck, Ginsburg explained that
she was challenging laws that reflect or enforce traditional sex-role
stereotypes because such laws restrict individual opportunity and
subordinate women: “presumably well-meaning exaltation of woman’s
unique role in bearing children has, in effect, denied women equal
opportunity to develop their individual talents and capacities and has
impelled them to accept a dependent, subordinate status in society.”197
195. See, e.g., Baer, supra note 68, at 216, 231 (“Fourteen of the [nineteen] cases decided
since Craig were brought by men. Lower court cases exhibit a similar pattern. The women’s
won-lost record is better than the men’s; moreover, victories by men do not necessarily
harm women and may benefit them. But so far men have been the primary beneficiaries of
the new sexual equality doctrine. Ruth Bader Ginsburg has given no indication that this
outcome troubles her. She continues to regard sex equality not as requiring the elimination
of male supremacy, but as a problem of discrimination, of basing decisions on a person’s
sex.”); David Cole, Strategies of Difference: Litigating for Women’s Rights in a Man’s
World, 2 L. & INEQUALITY 33, 55 (1984) (“Ginsburg chose to litigate issues that she could
frame as hurting both men and women, rather than issues, like pregnancy discrimination,
where the harm fell on women alone. She sought to deny women’s ‘difference;’ this strategy
both limited her range and increased her chances for success. Ginsburg’s classic argument
was to insist that women were like men. She sought to show that women were similarly
situated, but that society had treated them differently because of stereotypical ‘old notions’
and ‘archaic assumptions’ about sex roles. . . . Nevertheless, Ginsburg’s assimilationist
method could not address the entire range of women’s rights issues. Assimilation is most
obviously an insufficient response to issues of reproductive freedom. In this area, women
are biologically different, and therefore women must be treated differently to be treated
equally.”). Justice Ginsburg has herself summarized much of this criticism. See Ruth Bader
Ginsburg & Barbara Flagg, Some Reflections on the Feminist Legal Thought of the 1970s,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 9, 17 (1989) (Feminist legal scholars “have portrayed the 1970s
litigation as assimilationist in outlook, insistent on formal equality, opening doors only to
comfortably situated women willing to accept men’s rules and be treated like men, even a
misguided effort that harmed more women than it helped.”). Cary Franklin documents (and
refutes) this criticism at length. See generally Franklin, supra note 86.
196. See Siegel & Siegel, supra note 146 (arguing that “Ginsburg was able to perceive
social subordination in the exclusion of a pregnant woman from military service, even
though pregnancy had long been understood as the principal physical difference between the
sexes, because she saw that government regulation was enforcing traditional sex
stereotypes”).
197. Brief for the Petitioner, Struck v. Sec’y of Def., supra note 146, at 38. See id. at 3845 (discussing, inter alia, Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873); Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Hoyt v. Florida, 368
U.S. 57 (1961)).
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Captain Struck, Ginsburg explained, “was presumed unfit for service under
a regulation that declares, without regard to fact, that she fits into the
stereotyped vision of the ‘correct’ female response to pregnancy.”198
Ginsburg’s concern about the law’s enforcement of traditional sex-role
stereotypes encompasses a concern about wrongful interference with
individual opportunity, but it is not a concern about any and all
differentiation. Rather, she has focused on differentiation with respect to
certain practices that have long been associated with the subordination of
women.199
Fundamentally, antisubordination concerns motivate Justice
Ginsburg’s approach to the problem of sex discrimination. She thus wrote
for the Court in the VMI case that sex classifications “may not be used . . .
to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of
women.”200 Justice Ginsburg regards the historic subordination of women
in America as the principal reason to regard with suspicion laws enforcing
traditional sex-role stereotypes that constrain their opportunities. On those
occasions when she insists that men and women should be treated
essentially the same for most purposes, as in the VMI case, it is for reasons
that are primarily associated with an antisubordination perspective, not a
commitment to formal equality.201 The same is true of her willingness—
indeed, eagerness—to view men as victims of sex discrimination in certain
situations.202
Antisubordination values thus define what constitutional equality is
for Justice Ginsburg. She does not regard an antisubordination approach as
an alternative to equality analysis. Rather, she regards antisubordination as
equality in the sense she celebrates when using the phrases “equal
citizenship stature” or “equal dignity.” That is, she conceives equality as
equal standing and respect, and this conception guides her assessment of

198. Id. at 50-51 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
199. For an argument that Americans have slowly been coming closer to embracing

Justice Ginsburg’s view of the relationship between pregnancy discrimination and sex
discrimination, see generally Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Pregnancy and Sex Role
Stereotyping, From Struck to Carhart, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming November 2009). In
this essay, Reva Siegel and I argue (among other things) that it is time to reexamine the
ways we read Geduldig, see supra note 146, in light of both subsequent legal developments
and what the opinion actually says about the circumstances in which pregnancy
discrimination does not qualify as unconstitutional sex discrimination. Id.
200. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34 (1996) (footnote omitted).
201. Cf. generally Franklin, supra note 86 (rejecting the formal-equality reading of
Ginsburg’s approach to the problem of sex discrimination).
202. See supra notes 186-189 and accompanying text (discussing Cary Franklin’s work,
which explains why Professor Ginsburg represented male plaintiffs in some of the sex
discrimination cases that she litigated during the 1970s).
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when equality values are implicated. Such guidance is critical in order to
determine when differentiation implicates equality. This is a key theme of
the aforementioned passage in her majority opinion in VMI:
“Inherent differences” between men and women, we have come
to appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for
denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial
constraints on an individual’s opportunity. Sex classifications
may be used to compensate women “for particular economic
disabilities [they have] suffered,” to “promot[e] equal
employment opportunity,” to advance full development of the
talent and capacities of our Nation’s people. But such
classifications may not be used, as they once were, to create or
perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of
women.203

Because Justice Ginsburg’s conception of equality is infused with
antisubordination values, it can deal with “[i]nherent differences” between
the sexes. As noted above, her substantive understanding of equality is
powerful enough to indict exclusion on the basis of motherhood, including
in cases of pregnancy, even though pregnancy had long been understood as
the principal physical difference between the sexes. In contrast to
discrimination against pregnant women, which Justice Ginsburg always has
viewed as a paradigmatic form of sex discrimination,204 she likely did not
devote her litigation efforts to opposing, say, sex-segregated bathrooms
because separate restrooms for men and women do not implicate basic
questions about the equal citizenship stature of women.205
Justice Ginsburg also uses an antisubordination approach to identify
the perspective from which equality determinations should be made. That
is, she determines whether equality values are implicated primarily from
the standpoint of members of historically excluded groups, not principally
from the perspective of members of included groups—which was the
203. 518 U.S. at 533-34 (citations and footnote omitted).
204. See supra notes 146-149, 196-198 and accompanying text (discussing Justice

Ginsburg’s views on pregnancy discrimination).
205. I am referencing, of course, restroom privacy objections to the Equal Rights
Amendment. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Fear of the Equal Rights Amendment,
WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 1975, at A21 (“Separate places to disrobe, sleep, perform personal
bodily functions are permitted, in some situations required, by regard for individual
privacy.”). What Ginsburg labeled the “potty issue,” id., “did not die with the ERA.
Scholars continued to raise the question of segregated bathrooms to highlight the difference
between race discrimination and sex discrimination. And constitutional law casebooks
continued to discuss the potty issue, canonizing it as a central question of sex discrimination
law.” Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality,
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 957 n.26 (2002) (citation omitted).
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approach taken by, among many others, the majority in Plessy v.
Ferguson206 and Bradwell v. Illinois.207 For example, she approached a
recent pay discrimination case from the perspective of the victim:

206. 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (“We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s
argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps
the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything
found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon
it.”).
207. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (upholding the exclusion of women from the practice
of law). In a concurring opinion, Justice Bradley wrote:

[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman.
Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender. The natural and
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently
unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the
family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as
in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which
properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. The
harmony, not to say identity, of interest and views which belong, or
should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a
woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her
husband. So firmly fixed was this sentiment in the founders of the
common law that it became a maxim of that system of jurisprudence
that a woman had no legal existence separate from her husband, who
was regarded as her head and representative in the social state; and,
notwithstanding some recent modifications of this civil status, many of
the special rules of law flowing from and dependent upon this cardinal
principle still exist in full force in most States. One of these is, that a
married woman is incapable, without her husband’s consent, of making
contracts which shall be binding on her or him. This very incapacity was
one circumstance which the Supreme Court of Illinois deemed
important in rendering a married woman incompetent fully to perform
the duties and trusts that belong to the office of an attorney and
counsellor.
It is true that many women are unmarried and not affected by any of
the duties, complications, and incapacities arising out of the married
state, but these are exceptions to the general rule. The paramount
destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices
of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). “Although the method of
communication between the Creator and the jurist is never disclosed,” Professor Ginsburg
wrote in her Struck brief, “‘divine ordinance’ has been a dominant theme in decisions
justifying laws establishing sex-based classifications.” Brief for the Petitioner, Struck v.
Sec’y of Def., supra note 146, at 39.
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The Court’s insistence on immediate contest overlooks common
characteristics of pay discrimination. Pay disparities often occur,
as they did in Ledbetter’s case, in small increments; cause to
suspect that discrimination is at work develops only over time.
Comparative pay information, moreover, is often hidden from
the employee’s view. Employers may keep under wraps the pay
differentials maintained among supervisors, no less the reasons
for those differentials. Small initial discrepancies may not be
seen as meet for a federal case, particularly when the employee,
trying to succeed in a nontraditional environment, is averse to
making waves.208

Congress subsequently endorsed the perspective that Justice Ginsburg
adopted in dissent. The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 was the first
bill that President Obama signed into law.209
In addition to revealing her commitment to combating subordination,
Justice Ginsburg’s references to “equal dignity,” “essential human dignity,”
and “full human stature” are instructive in a second way: she uses the terms
“citizenship” stature and “human” stature interchangeably. She does not
mean to include within her vision only United States citizens.210 Rather, she
seems to invoke the language of citizenship to express the general idea of
inclusion within the American political community. The difference
between these two senses of citizenship obviously can have significant
implications in several areas of American politics and law, including
208. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2178-79 (2007)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice Ginsburg further wrote:

Pay disparities are thus significantly different from adverse actions
“such as termination, failure to promote, . . . or refusal to hire,” all
involving fully communicated discrete acts, “easy to identify” as
discriminatory. It is only when the disparity becomes apparent and
sizable, e.g., through future raises calculated as a percentage of current
salaries, that an employee in Ledbetter’s situation is likely to
comprehend her plight and, therefore, to complain. Her initial readiness
to give her employer the benefit of the doubt should not preclude her
from later challenging the then current and continuing payment of a
wage depressed on account of her sex.
Id. at 2179.
209. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Equal-Pay Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/us/politics/30ledbetter-web.html.
210. For a forceful expression of concern that privileging citizenship would exclude
many politically and economically vulnerable people, see Rachel F. Moran, Terms of
Belonging, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, supra note 5, at 136 (“As U.S. history shows,
there are many types of exile from the American dream, whether through expulsion from
our borders or relegation to second-class status with them. In light of these transgressions,
progressives’ enthusiasm for citizenship bewilders me.”).

840

NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:799

terrorism cases211 and immigration cases.212 It also may have significant
implications should the Court elect to reinvigorate the Privileges Or
Immunities Clause of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment.213
Noncitizens are hardly invisible to Justice Ginsburg’s constitutional
vision.214
Third, Justice Ginsburg’s vision encompasses both an equality and a
liberty component. As explored above, Justice Ginsburg’s frequent use of
the term “equal” (and “full” as an apparent synonym for “equal”215)
captures her aspirational understanding of the Constitution that she
embraced during her confirmation hearings: those who were previously
excluded are now to be included within the constitutional conception of
“We the People.”216 She understands the Civil War Amendments as
designed to accomplish the great aim of making equal citizens of the
descendents of slaves and other historically excluded groups.217
At the same time, Justice Ginsburg’s use of the phrase “essential
human dignity” appears to imply a floor, an irreducible minimum of
autonomy that government must accord each person regardless of how it

211. One issue in cases involving the indefinite detention or trial of alleged enemy
combatants is whether the citizenship status of the detainee makes any difference to the
constitutional analysis. See supra note 175 and accompanying text (citing recent terrorism
decisions by the Court).
212. See, e.g., Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 74-97 (2001) (O’Connor, J., joined by
Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 460-71
(1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Both decisions upheld provisions of immigration law that
made it easier for children of single-citizen mothers to become citizens than children of
single-citizen fathers.
213. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. A key question is whether this clause, unlike the
Due Process and Equal Protection Causes, protects only U.S. citizens. This issue was one of
the subjects of discussion at a conference sponsored by the American Constitution Society
during November 2008. See The Second Founding and the Reconstruction Amendments:
Toward a More Perfect Union, http://www.acslaw.org/secondfounding.
214. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 184, at 335 (endorsing Professor Louis Henkin’s use
of the word “person” rather than “citizen” in discussing human rights because such usage
“reflect[s] a commitment to respect the individual rights of all human beings”) (discussing
Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad
and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11, 32 (1985)).
215. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996) (“[T]he Court has
repeatedly recognized that neither federal nor state government acts compatibly with the
equal protection principle when a law or official policy denies to women, simply because
they are women, full citizenship stature—equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in
and contribute to society based on their individual talents and capacities.” (emphases
added)).
216. See supra notes 71-82 and accompanying text (quoting Justice Ginsburg).
217. See supra note 136 (quoting the principal dissent in Parents Involved).
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treats other persons—a zone of individual freedom into which government
may not intrude.218 To be sure, she tends to emphasize the ideal of human
dignity as equality more often than the ideal of dignity as liberty, implying
that the equality ideal occupies a favored position in her scheme of
constitutional values. But appropriate focus on this key component of her
constitutional vision does not imply that the liberty ideal plays an
insignificant role.219 I note again her observation that the Founders “stated a
commitment” not only “to equality,” but also “to individual liberty.”220
More importantly, Justice Ginsburg registers that laws intervening in
major life decisions and enforcing status roles may simultaneously
implicate both equality and liberty—equal protection and due process. For
example, restricting women’s liberty may be a means to the end of
communicating inequality, and discriminating against women may be a
means to the end of diminishing their opportunities to make their own

218. Justice Ginsburg thus joined (and subsequently invoked) the following language
from Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Lawrence:

Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components
of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more
specific. They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times
can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once
thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the
Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its
principles in their own search for greater freedom.
539 U.S. at 578-79. See Ginsburg, supra note 184, at 336 (highlighting this portion of
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion).
219. For example, although Justice Ginsburg views the institution of affirmative action as
primarily implicating values of constitutional equality, liberty concerns nonetheless inform
her reasoning in this area of the law. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 276 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“Court review can ensure that preferences are not so large as to trammel unduly
upon the opportunities of others or interfere too harshly with legitimate expectations of
persons in once-preferred groups.”).
220. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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meaning of their lives.221 For Justice Ginsburg, it seems less important to
disentangle these two clusters of constitutional commitments than it is to
emphasize the ways in which they are connected.222
Justice Ginsburg’s insistence on equal citizenship stature integrates
her approaches to several important areas of constitutional law. Her votes
in potentially distinct cases—those implicating gender discrimination,
reproductive rights, racial equality, disability rights, federalism,
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, church/state separation,
terrorism, the death penalty, and international law—are not conceptually
independent of one another. They are not merely a series of jurisprudential
“silos.” There is significant depth and coherence to Justice Ginsburg’s
constitutional jurisprudence, a depth and coherence that is attributable to
her progressive constitutional vision.223
221. For development of this insight, see Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of
Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1738-45,
1763-66 (2008). “Concern that restrictions on women’s liberty can communicate meanings
about women’s social standing lies at the heart of the sex discrimination cases, especially
those cases invalidating laws that deny women autonomy to make decisions about their
family roles.” Id. at 1744-45.
222. Thus, in Struck Professor Ginsburg challenged pregnancy discrimination as violative
of both equal protection and due process. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. See,
e.g., Brief for the Petitioner, Struck v. Sec’y of Def., supra note 146, at 52 (“The
discriminatory treatment required by the challenged regulation . . . reflects the discredited
notion that a woman who becomes pregnant is not fit for duty, but should be confined at
home to await childbirth and thereafter devote herself to child care. Imposition of this
outmoded standard upon petitioner unconstitutionally encroaches upon her right to privacy
in the conduct of her personal life.”) (footnote omitted).
223. One might object that it is possible to share Justice Ginsburg’s concern with the
historically (or currently) powerless and yet reject her conclusions in specific areas of the
law. For example, opponents of abortion rights have long insisted on the full human status
of the fetus. Cf., e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1634 (2007) (describing an
“unborn child” as “a child assuming the human form”). I agree that people who are equally
concerned about the politically disempowered may disagree about the abortion issue itself.
But I would be loath to conclude that they share a common constitutional vision without
knowing whether their concern for the vulnerable includes a commitment to the full equality
of women. And to get at that question, I would want to know their views on, say,
accommodation of motherhood and accessibility to contraception and sex education. If
opponents of abortion hold views that compromise women’s equality in these areas as well,
and if they view coercing childbirth as the only or the primary way to protect the unborn,
then I would be inclined to conclude that they do not share Justice Ginsburg’s inclusive
vision. It seems more likely that they possess a different vision and are attempting to
appropriate feminist frames for distinct normative purposes. For an illustration of social
movement struggle in this area where one group adopts a powerful frame of its agonist, see,
for example, Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of
Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1677-79 (2008) (2007
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I therefore do not share the concern of some legal academics about
“the absence of anything like a heroic vision on the Court’s left.”224 For
reasons I will soon offer, I agree that Justice Ginsburg is not a “visionary”
in an aggressive sense.225 But as I have shown, Justice Ginsburg does
possess a heroic constitutional vision. I shall now consider whether the
aggression of a visionary is what is most required in order to realize her
vision.
III. The Pursuit of Justice Ginsburg’s Vision
Champions of Justice Ginsburg’s constitutional vision are justifiably
inspired by its clear-sighted series of insistences: that history did in fact
happen and must be reckoned with in the present; that those who were long
excluded from the constitutional community must now be included; that the
ideal of human equality is substantive, not formal, and must be vindicated,
not betrayed.
To be persuaded by a constitutional vision, however, is not to
persuade others to adopt it. And without persuading a majority of one’s
fellow citizens over a sustained period of time, proponents of a
constitutional vision cannot prevail in our constitutional politics or our
constitutional law. The stakes are often high. Right now, for example,
supporters of President Barack Obama—many of whom presumably share
much of Justice Ginsburg’s constitutional vision—might ask themselves
what it will take to ensure that his presidency ends up being as
consequential as they hope it will be—what is required to make the
outcome of the 2008 presidential election more like President Roosevelt’s
victory in 1932 and less like President Carter’s victory in 1976.
I do not presume that many of President Obama’s supporters share
Justice Ginsburg’s constitutional vision merely because the two can be
categorized as “liberals.” Nor do I assume a connection just because the
very election of Barack Obama as our nation’s forty-fourth President

Brainerd Currie Lecture). For a sketch of how different American society would have to
look for abortion-restrictive regulation not to rest in substantial part on traditional sex-role
stereotypes about women, see Siegel, supra note 113, at 366-67.
224. Cass R. Sunstein, Where Are the Liberal Visionaries on the Supreme Court?, TNR
Online, May 15, 2007. Cf. infra note 249 (quoting other legal academics).
225. I read Professor Sunstein as suggesting that “genuine visionaries” not only possess a
constitutional vision, but also seek to realize the vision in a particular way—namely,
through “sweeping opinions” that throw caution and compromise to the wind. Id. I agree
that Justice Ginsburg is no visionary in this sense. See infra Part III (discussing Justice
Ginsburg’s characteristically careful approach to achieving social change through
constitutional adjudication).
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partially embodies the power of realizing Justice Ginsburg’s vision.226
Rather, Justice Ginsburg and President Obama tend to speak about
American constitutional identity in strikingly similar ways, and they appear
to have similar ideas about how best to persuade fellow Americans to adopt
their conception. For example, then-Senator Obama titled his Philadelphia
speech on American race relations “A More Perfect Union,” and he began
it by reciting the opening words of the Constitution.227 Justice Ginsburg
could have uttered much of the aspirational language that followed.228
Senator Obama noted that the document produced by the Framers
during the summer of 1787 “was eventually signed but ultimately
unfinished,” for “[i]t was stained by this nation’s original sin of slavery”
and left “any final resolution to future generations.”229 This resolution,
however, “was already embedded within our Constitution—a Constitution
that had at its very core the ideal of equal citizenship under the law; a
Constitution that promised its people liberty, and justice, and a union that
could be and should be perfected over time.”230 Yet fine words on paper did
not suffice:

226. I obviously cannot prove such a statement. But I can suggest that it seems a
promising way to account for the number of Americans who wept on Election Night and the
following day, including Americans who are not characteristically prone to public displays
of great emotion. Anyone who doubts the depth and power of Justice Ginsburg’s
constitutional vision might consider this moment in American history and how many
Americans of diverse backgrounds experienced it—even some who voted for Senator John
McCain.
227. Senator Barack Obama, Address at the National Constitution Center: A More
Perfect Union (Mar. 18, 2008) (transcript available at http://my.barackobama.com/page
/content/hisownwords) (“We the people, in order to form a more perfect union.”). He
omitted the phrase “of the United States.” See id.
228. I do not do sufficient work in this piece to establish that Justice Ginsburg and
President Obama share the same essential progressive vision of our Constitution. This Part,
however, offers evidence that suggests substantial similarities in the basic constitutional
outlooks of this Justice and this President. I recognize, however, that there are also likely to
be important differences between them. For example, it is not clear how a commitment to
equal citizenship stature explains some of the Obama Administration’s positions on
executive power.
229. Obama, supra note 227.
230. Id.
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[W]ords on a parchment would not be enough to deliver slaves
from bondage, or provide men and women of every color and
creed their full rights and obligations as citizens of the United
States. What would be needed were Americans in successive
generations who were willing to do their part—through protests
and struggle, on the streets and in the courts, through a civil war
and civil disobedience and always at great risk—to narrow that
gap between the promise of our ideals and the reality of their
time.231

President Obama’s Constitution, like Justice Ginsburg’s, is an
intergenerational project of making good on the promises that “We the
People” implicitly made to ourselves and to one another in the beginning—
despite many of our practices—through the ideals we espoused and the
inclusive language we used. “[T]he true genius of this nation,” Obama
insisted in Philadelphia, “is that America can change.”232 “What we have
already achieved gives us hope—the audacity to hope—for what we can
and must achieve tomorrow.”233 Justice Ginsburg agrees with the President
not only that “[the] union may never be perfect,” but also that “generation
after generation has shown that it can always be perfected.”234 Like
President Obama, moreover, she has elected to emphasize the latter point as
much as the former, implying (among other things) that there is good
reason genuinely to love this country and to be proud to be an American.
As inspiring as this constitutional vision is, it may encounter certain
vulnerabilities that its proponents ignore at their peril. To be sure, I am in
no position to make strong claims here, for transforming a constitutional
vision into a governing reality requires the acumen of a skillful political

231.
232.
233.
234.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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leader, particularly a President.235 But my sense that the vulnerabilities I
perceive are real is strengthened by the fact that a politically astute
President appears to have recognized and given voice to them.
A key vulnerability concerns the potential pitfalls of constitutionally
privileging certain groups over others amidst the appearance and reality of
scarce resources and opportunities. Advocates of an inclusive vision must
decide which groups to privilege and why in particular settings, and how to
negotiate conflicts among them.236 They must also be mindful of how a
constitutional vision that stresses expanding the locus of constitutional
concern—that emphasizes including and empowering historically
marginalized groups—may be received by working-class white Americans
who live with substantial economic anxiety and who do not feel advantaged
on account of their race:
Most working- and middle-class white Americans don’t feel that
they have been particularly privileged by their race. Their
experience is the immigrant experience—as far as they’re
concerned, no one’s handed them anything, they’ve built it from
scratch. They’ve worked hard all their lives, many times only to
see their jobs shipped overseas or their pension dumped after a

235. Keith Whittington has underscored the central role of presidential leadership in the
articulation of a constitutional vision:

The presidential office is unique in American politics, and it invites its
occupant to make expansive claims to the authority to lead the nation.
Moreover, part of the presidential agenda is likely to involve
constitutional meaning. The Constitution is foundational in American
politics, not only in the sense that it establishes the boundaries of legal
action but also in the sense that it authorizes, invites, and structures
political activity. An implicit or explicit constitutional discourse comes
naturally to presidents, not because they are special caretakers of our
constitutional tradition but because their visions of political leadership
lead them to push the boundaries of that tradition. The president “tells
us stories about ourselves, and in so doing he tells us what sort of people
we are, how we are constituted as a community. We take from him not
only our policies but our national self-identity.”
WHITTINGTON, supra note 28, at 19 (quoting MARY E. STUCKEY, THE PRESIDENT AS
INTERPRETER-IN-CHIEF 1 (1991)).
236. The 2008 election cycle offered illuminating instances of potential fault lines.
Identity politics bitterly divided some supporters of Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, and
African-Americans played a significant role in securing the passage of Proposition 8 in
California. See, e.g., Caitlin Flanagan & Benjamin Schwarz, Editorial, Showdown in the Big
Tent, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2008, at WK11 (“The struggle for equality—beginning with
freedom from human bondage . . . —has been so central to African-American identity that
many blacks find homosexual claims of a commensurate level of injustice frivolous, and
even offensive.”).
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lifetime of labor. They are anxious about their futures, and feel
their dreams slipping away; in an era of stagnant wages and
global competition, opportunity comes to be seen as a zero sum
game, in which your dreams come at my expense. So when they
are told to bus their children to a school across town; when they
hear that an African American is getting an advantage in landing
a good job or a spot in a good college because of an injustice that
they themselves never committed; when they’re told that their
fears about crime in urban neighborhoods are somehow
prejudiced, resentment builds over time.237

If then-Senator Obama had talked about race and inequality in a fullthroated antisubordination register, speaking only on behalf of certain
groups in American society, it seems far less likely that he would have
been elected President of the United States. It is noteworthy in this regard
that Justice Ginsburg has counted propertyless white males among the
previously excluded groups who achieved inclusion within “We the
People.”238 It is also noteworthy that she always has emphasized what
women and men both have to gain by ending the separate spheres tradition
of subordinating women through sex-role stereotypes.239
Obama spoke about race from multiple points of view, and regarding
each of them he carefully distinguished legitimate concerns from misplaced
or counterproductive hostility and scapegoating.240 He spoke about racial

237. Obama, supra note 227.
238. See supra text accompanying note 81.
239. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 50, at 270.

By enshrining and promoting the woman’s “natural” role as selfless
homemaker, and correspondingly emphasizing the man’s role as
provider, the state impeded both men and women from pursuit of the
very opportunities and styles of life that could enable them to break
away from traditional patterns and develop their full, human capacities.
Id.
240. See, e.g., Obama, supra note 227 (“[W]e do need to remind ourselves that so many
of the disparities that exist in the African-American community today can be directly traced
to inequalities passed on from an earlier generation that suffered under the brutal legacy of
slavery and Jim Crow.”); id. (“For the men and women of Reverend Wright’s generation,
the memories of humiliation and doubt and fear have not gone away; nor has the anger and
the bitterness of those years.”).

The fact that so many people are surprised to hear that anger in some of
Reverend Wright’s sermons simply reminds us of the old truism that the
most segregated hour in American life occurs on Sunday morning. That
anger is not always productive; indeed, all too often it distracts attention
from solving real problems; it keeps us from squarely facing our own
complicity in our condition, and prevents the African-American
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dialogue and reconciliation as he unblinkingly appreciated “the
complexities of race in this country that we’ve never really worked
through—a part of our union that we have yet to perfect.”241 And he spoke
about interests, values, and identities that unite Americans despite their
differences.242
Obama also spoke directly to African Americans, white Americans,
and all Americans. To African Americans, he insisted that the path to a
more perfect union means not only “continuing to insist on a full measure
of justice in every aspect of American life,” but also “binding our particular
grievances—for better health care, and better schools, and better jobs—to

community from forging the alliances it needs to bring about real
change. But the anger is real; it is powerful; and to simply wish it away,
to condemn it without understanding its roots, only serves to widen the
chasm of misunderstanding that exists between the races.
Id.
Just as black anger often proved counterproductive, so have these white
resentments distracted attention from the real culprits of the middle class
squeeze—a corporate culture rife with inside dealing, questionable
accounting practices, and short-term greed; a Washington dominated by
lobbyists and special interests; economic policies that favor the few over
the many. And yet, to wish away the resentments of white Americans, to
label them as misguided or even racist, without recognizing they are
grounded in legitimate concerns—this too widens the racial divide, and
blocks the path to understanding.
Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.

I believe deeply that we cannot solve the challenges of our time unless
we solve them together—unless we perfect our union by understanding
that we may have different stories, but we hold common hopes; that we
may not look the same and we may not have come from the same place,
but we all want to move in the same direction—towards a better future
for our children and our grandchildren.
Id. (“It’s a story that hasn’t made me the most conventional candidate. But it is a story that
has seared into my genetic makeup the idea that this nation is more than the sum of its
parts—that out of many, we are truly one.”); id. (“[W]orking together we can move beyond
some of our old racial wounds, and . . . in fact we have no choice if we are to continue on
the path of a more perfect union.”); id. (“Let us find the common stake we all have in one
another, and let our politics reflect that spirit as well.”).
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the larger aspirations of all Americans—the white woman struggling to
break the glass ceiling, the white man whose been laid off, the immigrant
trying to feed his family.”243 And to white Americans, he urged:
[T]he path to a more perfect union means acknowledging that
what ails the African-American community does not just exist in
the minds of black people; that the legacy of discrimination—
and current incidents of discrimination, while less overt than in
the past—are real and must be addressed. Not just with words,
but with deeds—by investing in our schools and our
communities; by enforcing our civil rights laws and ensuring
fairness in our criminal justice system; by providing this
generation with ladders of opportunity that were unavailable for
previous generations.244

He suggested that the path to a more perfect union requires “all Americans
to realize that your dreams do not have to come at the expense of my
dreams; that investing in the health, welfare, and education of black and
brown and white children will ultimately help all of America prosper.”245
For President Obama, as Cass Sunstein has written movingly,
“reconciliation is change, and it is also what makes change possible.”246
For reasons of both principle and pragmatism, President Obama’s
approach may have much to offer Americans who seek to realize
something like Justice Ginsburg’s constitutional vision by making certain
claims on the Constitution. Relatedly, the President’s approach is relevant
to an assessment of the ways in which Justice Ginsburg has (and has not)
gone about executing her judicial responsibilities.
As a matter of basic justice and human well-being, progressives are
right to attend to the social dislocations attending past and present practices
of subordination. Yet an antisubordination perspective is necessarily a
group-based perspective, and reifying Americans into discrete groups
243. Id. Obama’s repeated references to health and health care in the speech help to
explain his strong commitment to health care reform despite the substantial political risks
that such legislation entails. Health care appears to be no mere piece of his policy agenda;
rather, it seems to be a key component of a constitutional vision that stresses full and equal
citizenship.
244. Id. Compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (“We consider the
underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced
separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so,
it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses
to put that construction upon it.”). Professor Obama presumably had Plessy (among other
things) in mind.
245. Obama, supra note 227.
246. Cass R. Sunstein, The Visionary Minimalist, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 30, 2008, at
15.
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misses an important part of how many of them experience themselves and
their country. Part of what is so powerful about Obama’s message is his
emphasis on the common national identity that Americans passionately
share—even if some of their most profound disagreements are about the
meaning of that very identity.247 A commitment to combating subordination
is critically important in both constitutional politics and constitutional law,
but it is not the only relevant commitment.
Pragmatically, Obama’s approach suggests that effectiveness may at
times require tying one’s own demands to the demands of others.
Persuasion may also require changing the subject, at least for a time, from
areas of intractable disagreement to areas of potential agreement. And
success may require a degree of moderation, accommodation, and
compromise with Americans of diverse backgrounds who respond to
identity-defining conflicts in different ways.248 It may at times be necessary
to temper the present expression of a vision in order to facilitate its
eventual (or partial) adoption—or to avoid its repudiation before it has an

247. As Professor Sunstein observes:

He is unifying, and therefore able to think ambitiously, because he
insists that Americans are not different “types” who should see each
other as adversaries engaged in some kind of culture war. Above all,
Obama rejects identity politics. He participates in, and helps create, antiidentity politics. He does so by emphasizing that most people have
diverse roles, loyalties, positions, and concerns, and that the familiar
divisions are hopelessly inadequate ways of capturing people’s selfunderstandings, or their hopes for their nation.
Id.
248. See id. (“Obama believes that real change usually requires consensus, learning, and
accommodation.”). Professor Bickel made a related point:

No society, certainly not a large and heterogeneous one, can fail in time
to explode if it is deprived of the arts of compromise, if it knows no
ways of muddling through. No good society can be unprincipled; and no
viable society can be principle-ridden. But it is not true in our society
that we are generally governed wholly by principle in some matters and
indulge a rule of expediency exclusively in others. There is no such neat
dividing line . . . . Most often, . . . and as often as not in matters of the
widest and deepest concern, such as the racial problem, both
requirements exist most imperatively side by side: guiding principle and
expedient compromise. The role of principle, when it cannot be the
immutable governing rule, is to affect the tendency of policies of
expediency. And it is a potent role.
BICKEL, supra note 31, at 64.
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adequate opportunity to succeed. Progressive criticism of Justice Ginsburg
as too moderate and too cautious a jurist may, at times, fail to register these
concerns.249
It is for good reason that Justice Ginsburg, during her time as an
advocate and then a judge, took a slow, measured, and fundamentally
dialogic approach to accomplishing social change through constitutional
litigation. Looking at the matter years later from the perspective of the
judiciary, she explained that courts are least likely to succeed in bringing
about major social changes when acting on their own. Rather, she insisted
that courts are in the best position to succeed when they maintain a
dialogue with more democratic institutions of government—namely,
federal and state legislatures and executives, as well as the People
themselves.250 This was a principal theme of her March 1993 James
Madison Lecture on Constitutional Law at New York University.251

249. Cf., e.g., Liptak, supra note 18, at WK4 (“These days, Professor [Geoffrey] Stone
said: ‘The right side is very bold and very conservative. The liberal side is not bold. They
are incrementalists. They don’t set the agenda.’”); id. (“The old-school liberal justices were
simply more ambitious than Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, Professor Eisgruber said.”);
Sunstein, supra notes 224-225 and accompanying text (recording similar views).
250. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 50, at 270 (“The Supreme Court, since the 1970s, has
effectively carried on in the gender discrimination cases a dialogue with the political
branches of the government. The Court wrote modestly, it put forth no grand philosophy.”);
see also Bagenstos, supra note 145, at 50, 56-59 (arguing that Justice Ginsburg’s majority
opinion in Olmstead “is both a perfect example of this kind of dialogic judicial action and
evidence for its effectiveness in achieving the goals of social-change-oriented litigators”).
251. See Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, supra note 81, at 1198.

[J]udges play an interdependent part in our democracy. They do not
alone shape legal doctrine but, as I suggested at the outset, they
participate in a dialogue with other organs of government, and with the
people as well. “[J]udges do and must legislate,” Justice Holmes
“recognize[d] without hesitation,” but “they can do so,” he cautioned,
“only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions.”
Measured motions seem to me right, in the main, for constitutional as
well as common law adjudication. Doctrinal limbs too swiftly shaped,
experience teaches, may prove unstable.
Id. at 1204 (footnotes omitted).
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What Justice Ginsburg has stressed about the efficacy of courts is
relevant as well to participants in constitutional politics. To underscore
again, proponents of a constitutional vision can succeed only to the extent
that they persuade a sufficient number of fellow citizens to embrace their
vision. And in a large, diverse nation, simply insisting without
qualification, accommodation, or patience on the fundamental rightness of
the vision may not be the most effective way to proceed.
How much and in what contexts proponents of a constitutional vision
should be prepared to bend their substantive commitments for the sake of
political persuasiveness, broader appeal, and social solidarity cannot be
answered at a theoretical level. It is a matter of judgment, timing, and tact
(among other things), which is to say that it is a matter of statesmanship.252
Matters of statesmanship are necessarily contestable, and so there will at
times be cause to question the judgment of a President whom one generally
supports regarding specific issues.253 But the problem of implementing a
constitutional vision cannot safely be disregarded by Americans who seek
to win national elections and (re)elect leaders who must govern a
heterogeneous nation.
To be clear, I am not gently implying that Justice Ginsburg’s vision
should be watered down to relative insignificance because the unvarnished
version has little chance of prevailing in America. Such a “solution” surely
would be worse than the potential vulnerabilities I have discussed. But I am
suggesting that those who seek to advance Justice Ginsburg’s constitutional
vision should articulate it in ways that will prove persuasive over the long
run to Americans whose support the vision requires in order to accomplish
its purposes. Political progressives should be loath to disregard this
suggestion, just as they should be loath to embrace the view, sometimes

In . . . cases . . . dealing with social insurance benefits for a worker’s
spouse or family, the decisions did not utterly condemn the legislature’s
product. Instead, the Court, in effect, opened a dialogue with the
political branches of government. In essence, the Court instructed
Congress and state legislatures: rethink ancient positions on these
questions. Should you determine that special treatment for women is
warranted . . . we have left you a corridor in which to move. But your
classifications must be refined, adopted for remedial reasons, and not
rooted in prejudice about “the way women (or men) are.”
Id. (footnotes and citation omitted)).
252. See generally Siegel, supra note 30 (analyzing statesmanship in the context of
judging).
253. For example, political progressives have articulated forceful criticisms of the Obama
Administration’s positions on judicial appointments, executive power, equal citizenship for
gay Americans, and the advisability of investigating alleged wrongdoing by the previous
administration.
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expressed in progressive circles, that Justice Ginsburg has been a
disappointment because she has not tried to move the law to a much greater
extent (and at a faster pace) than she has. Few progressive constitutionalists
have accomplished so much.254
I tender this suggestion in part because President Obama seemed to
proceed from a similar understanding during the 2008 election cycle and
demonstrated his capacity to succeed at winning national elections, just as
Justice Ginsburg before him demonstrated her capacity to alter significantly
the way that men view women—and themselves. At first glance, this
President and this Justice may seem like a strange pairing. But they share a
genuine commitment to the continued emancipation of the historically
excluded, and they share a quietly cool temperament—a professionalism, a
deliberativeness—that serves them well in their efforts to realize their
common commitment. Both are pioneers in a critically important sense,
and they carry their constitutional vision in their distinct institutional roles
with the same mindfulness that they must make community with
Americans who do not share their views. In their typically understated but
inspiring and often effective ways, President Obama and Justice Ginsburg
work to earn the trust of these Americans and to win them over.

254. Using language that may prove to be his most quoted legacy, Justice Souter offered
these words of wisdom just before leaving the Court:

Changes in societal understanding of the fundamental
reasonableness of government actions work out in much the same way
that individuals reconsider issues of fundamental belief. We can change
our own inherited views just so fast, and a person is not labeled a stickin-the-mud for refusing to endorse a new moral claim without having
some time to work through it intellectually and emotionally. Just as
attachment to the familiar and the limits of experience affect the
capacity of an individual to see the potential legitimacy of a moral
position, the broader society needs the chance to take part in the
dialectic of public and political back and forth about a new liberty claim
before it makes sense to declare unsympathetic state or national laws
arbitrary to the point of being unconstitutional. The time required is a
matter for judgment depending on the issue involved, but the need for
some time to pass before a court entertains a substantive due process
claim on the subject is not merely the requirement of judicial restraint as
a general approach, but a doctrinal demand to be satisfied before an
allegedly lagging legal regime can be held to lie beyond the discretion
of reasonable political judgment.
District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2341
(2009) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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APPRECIATION
It is not possible for me to discharge my personal debt to Justice
Ginsburg in the pages of a law review. I shall note here only a few facets of
the content of her character that have inspired me and that I have
endeavored to emulate in my own life. Among the qualities that come to
mind is Justice Ginsburg’s uncommon seriousness of purpose: her
insistence that the work of the Court comes before everything else,
including her own ego or those of her clerks.255 Other qualities include her
capacity to register the basic constitutional values at stake in a case; her
careful use of language; her focus on the factual record; her practice of
proceeding with slowness and precision even in the most pressure-filled
circumstances; her ability to sustain enduring friendships across ideological
divides; and, above all else, her tremendous inner strength and courage.256
I also am inspired by—and thankful for—the way that Justice
Ginsburg has engaged the central constitutional struggle of her career, the
fight for gender equality. Her approach has informed not only her
scholarship, advocacy, and opinion writing, but also her relationships with
people. During the year that I was fortunate to spend in her chambers, she
never once made me feel that I did not or could not understand the nature
of the problem of sex discrimination because I am a man. She assumed that
I wanted to understand and that I could if I actually took the time to listen
carefully.
Sex discrimination obviously has harmed women throughout
American history much more than it has harmed men—even to record such
an observation is to risk trivializing the experience of women. But Justice
Ginsburg has made clear through her words and deeds that the problem

255. “RBG” is not one to expend energy on sparing her clerks’ feelings in correcting their
errors of law or fact. But at the same time, she responds with gratitude, not defensiveness,
on those rare occasions when her clerks save her from error. For her, it is all about the work.
256. The Justice’s physical appearance can deceive those who do not know her. True
strength and courage cannot be measured in pounds. She is one of the toughest people I
have ever encountered.
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affects all of us and must be addressed by all of us.257 When an adoring
female visitor to chambers once remarked to Justice Ginsburg that her
“feminist” girlfriends just loved the Justice for what she had done for
American women, the Justice replied to the effect that she hoped the
visitor’s male friends loved her as well. I often think of this episode in
moments when I am mindful of how fulfilling it is to be a present father.
I am thankful to Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg for many
things. But most of all, I am grateful that my two young daughters will
inhabit a Union that has been perfected in part by the work she has done.

257. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 77, at xii (endorsing “Susan B. Anthony’s ultimate
vision: ‘man and woman working together to make the world the better for their having
lived’”) (quoting LYNN SHERR, FAILURE IS IMPOSSIBLE: SUSAN B. ANTHONY IN HER OWN
WORDS 305 (1995)); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (declaring
unconstitutional a provision of the Social Security Act that allowed a woman whose
husband died to receive benefits based on his earnings but did not allow a man whose wife
died to receive benefits based on her earnings). Justice Ginsburg has described Wiesenfeld
as “a case near and dear to my heart.” Ruth Bader Ginsburg, quoted in CAMPBELL, supra
note 86, at 93. This is perhaps because her client was a man who was ready, willing, and
able to raise his child in a society that considered him perverse for wanting to do what had
long been deemed “women’s work.”

